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There was enough evidence about Tribal Raid By Pakistan

In kashmir on September 25, 2009 at 17:24

There was enough evidence about Tribal Raid
By A Special Correspondent

There is enough evidence to suggest that the J&K government and Government of India had sufficient information about raiders’ invasion before hand.

Dr. Atri’s revelation:

On October 8, 1947 Dr. SK Atri, a leading doctor of Srinagar had been informed by some of his patients who held pro-Pak views that an invasion was in the offing. He took Prof. Madhok and many others into confidence about it. This is corroborated by Prof. Niranjan Nath Raina, the founder of the communist movement in Kashmir. In his book ‘Kashmir Politics and Imperialist manoeuvres’ (1846-1980), he writes:

“Some influential refugees from the NWFP with close personal contacts among the Pathan elite, reached Srinagar in second week of October. They had personal knowledge that Khan Bahadur Kuli Khan had been recruiting tribes in the Swat Valley for invasion of Kashmir”.

Indian forces pushing back Pakistani Invaders in Nov. 1947 in Teetwal Sector.

The communist group in the National Conference acting on this information issued a handbill on the 14th or 15th of October warning that an invasion was being planned to take place before the onset of winter. It asked all the patriotic forces to rise to the occasion to defend the state against invasion. At the same time it asked for transfer of power to the people, claiming that only a government enjoying the confidence of the people would be able to organise effective defence.

Cunnigham Letter:

George Cunnigham, who was Governor of NWFP at the time of partition, wrote a letter to Lord Mountbatten divulging information that Pakistan was sending armed tribesmen to Kashmir. His letter was forwarded to Prime Minister Nehru by the Viceroy. Pandit Nehru later admitted in Parliament to having accidentally destroyed the crucial document.

Dewan Shiv Sharan Lal, who was Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan had soon after his escape from Pakistan met Sardar Patel, the Home Minister and informed him about Pakistan’s preparations for invasion of Kashmir. Sardar Patel had, it is believed, despatched Dewan Shiv Sharan Lal to Srinagar to be in touch with DIG Kashmir, Sh. Gian Chand Bali.

Kalkat Episode:

By far the direct and comprehensive evidence about the Pakistani attack came from Major Onkar Singh Kalkot on 19th October i.e. more than two days prior to invasion.

Major OS Kalkat, who later rose to be the Major General in Indian Army was serving as the Brigade Major at HQ Bannu Frontier Brigade Group at the time when preparations were underway for tribal invasion. His Brigade head was Murray, a British national Kalkat had been with Murray for over a year and was in his confidence. He was a postgraduate in Economics from Delhi University and had joined the Army rather late at the age of 24 in 1942.

Soon after partition there was communal trouble in Mirpur, killings had gone unabated.. Kalkat had offered to go there but was restrained by Murray. The latter told him it was better that a white officer went there, otherwise the issue would get politicised. Kalkat’s family had already reached East Punjab.

Kalkat was under watch of Pakistani intelligence, a junior Lieutenant was watching his movements. Besides Kalkat there were other few non-Muslim military personnel stationed at Bannu brigade outpost.

Messenger packet used to come on every Monday. The duty officer brought the packet, Kalkat as Brigade Major signed for it. The packet marked ‘personal/top secret’ was meant for Brig. Murray. It was an official communication from Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. Major OS Kalkat was on the horns of a dilemma. As Brigade Major it was his duty to relay the message by radio to his Brigadier. At the same time becoming privy to what was supposed to be secret communication to his boss would put his life in danger. For a moment Kalkat hesitated. Then he opened the packet, which included a letter addressed to Brig. Murray. It was signed personally by General Sir Frank of Messervy, C in C. Kalkat on reading the contents of the letter got nervous and felt excited. He bolted the door of his room to study the details in secrecy.

The letter and the accompanying briefing note detailed the plan for an Army offensive named ‘Operation Gulmarg’. The invasion was planned by Pak Army Headquarters meticulously with considerable strategic and tactical insight. The ‘Operation Gulmarg’ was to be an invasion of the Kashmir valley by tribal warriors of the northern frontier areas, which were to be armed and led by Pak army officers wearing tribal dress. The headquarters of ‘Operation Gulmarg’ was to be in the building that housed General Messervy.

Kalkat was the only Indian to know of secret invasion planned by Pakistan. Destiny had chosen him for a very special task. There were still two months in which India could make effective preparations to foil Pakistan’s nefarious game-plan. Kalkat made notes hurriedly, making a point-by-point copy of the plan.

‘Operation Gulmarg’ had devised a three-pronged operation:

Hit and Run attacks along the border with J&K force dispersal of state forces of J&K into small groups.

Unleashing of systematic propaganda on the border areas inciting the Muslims to fight the forces of the Maharaja and resort to religious-cleansing of their non-Muslim neighbours.

Finally, thousands of tribal warriors were to cross the frontier into J&K and occupy every bridle road and mountain tracks.

According to this plan, as revealed by Major Kalkat, every Pathan tribe was required to enlist one Lashkar of 1,000 tribesmen. The tribal detachments were to be collected at Baftnu, Wana, Peshawar, Kohat, Thal and Nowshera by the first week of September, 1947. The Brigade Commanders at these places had to issue them arms/ammunition and essential clothing items. Each Lashkar was to be commanded by a Major. A Captain and 10 JCOs of the regular Pakistan army were also to be provided to each Lashkar. The invasion was to be commanded by Major General Akbar Khan, who was assigned the code name ‘Tariq’.

As per ‘Operation Gulmarg’ all Lashkars were to meet at Abbottabad by October 18th. Six Lashkars were to advance along the main road—Abbottabad-Muzaffarabad-Uri-Srinagar, with the specific task of capturing the Srinagar Airport and subsequently the Banihal pass. Two Lashkars were to march from Haji Pir Pass direct on to Gulmarg, ensuring the security of the right flank for the main force advancing from Muzaffarabad. Two other raiders’ detachments were to move from Tithwal through the Nastachchun Pass for capturing vital towns of erstwhile Baramulla district—Sopore, Handwara and Bandipore. 10 other Lashkars were assigned the task of capturing Poonch, Bhimbar and Rawalkot before advancing to Jammu. Detailed plans were made for procuring guides/informers to be provided to different Lashkars. These guides/were to come from pro-Pak elements in J&K State forces.

Arms/Ammunition and other required items were to be transhipped to Abbottabad by October 15th. These were to be subsequently moved to Muzaffarabad and Domel after the D-Day.

The D-Day was fixed as 22 October, on which date the Lashkars were to enter J&K territory. Pakistan’s 7 Infantry Division was to concentrate on the Murre-Abbottabad area by October 21st and was ordered to be ready to back up Lashkars entering J&K territory and help these consolidate their hold on the Kashmir valley. Another infantry brigade was to be kept ready at Sialkot to move on to Jammu. The main attack was to be launched along the motor road. The raiders force was supplied rifles, the LMGs, 300 civilian lorries were put at their disposal.

Kalkat after finishing the notes asked his two Sikh batmen to stay back for the nightwatch. This made his junior Lieutenant spying on him suspicious. Kalkat concealed the envelope he had received in utmost secrecy. Then he talked to Brigadier Murray on radiophone. Kalkat conveyed that a code-named ‘Operation Gulmarg’ had been drawn up by the Pak Army and described it as an astounding plan—an invasion by Tribals.

Brig. Murray asked Kalkat to keep the plan to himself and not to reveal more on the radio. He warned him that any leakage would put his (Kalkat’s) life in danger.

Kalkat believed Brigadier Murray to be a part of conspiracy and took his advice as a veiled threat to keep quiet. Murray reached Bannu the following morning. It is said that the Pakistani Lieutenant had overhead Kalkat’s radio-talk with Brigadier Murray.

The next morning Kalkat was on a stroll. The Lieutenant, accompanied by a British officer surrounded him, putting him under arrest. The British officer told him, ‘you just poked your nose into something too big’. Kalkat was taken in a jeep for Lahore. He believed that the Pakistani Lieutenant or Murray himself had summoned them from Pak Army Headquarters.

At the helipad Kalkat was put before Major General Akbar Khan. Murray was also brought there. As per one version Akbar Khan himself shot him dead. Kalkat was put under house arrest in Lahore. He made his escape from Lahore, hiding in a goods train and reached Delhi via Ambala.

On 19th October Major OS Kalkat met Brigadier Kulwant Singh and Defence Minister Baldev Singh and revealed what Pakistan was cooking up. He also met other senior army officers at the headquarters. The Defence Minister asked his Army Hqrs. to analyse Kalkat’s information.

A Brigadier dismissed Kalkat’s revelations (Operation Gulmarg) as a Cock and Bull story’ and said the latter had invented it as his family was caught up in the riots and that was weighing on his mind. The Brigadier further claimed that he had spoken to his friends at Pak Army Hqrs, who laughed away at any possibility of trouble between India and Pakistan. But a colonel who knew Kalkat for years disagreed with his Brigadier and said Kalkat was steady as a rock who would never say anything for which he did not have basis. Kalkat was then taken to Prime Minister Nehru and made to repeat what he had said earlier to Defence Minister and other officers at Army Hqrs. Angry Nehru stared at his Defence Minister. Before Kalkat could finish, Nehru let loose verbal barrage against his senior Army officers for disregarding Kalkat’s information. He rumbled through his papers, telegraph messages and army couriers and flung these at them and kept shouting unrestrained.

Nehru turned to Kalkat and acknowledged, “This man (Kalkat) here risked his life, forgot about his family, to come to us here, to the PMO office, to tell us about an attack, a perfidious attack on our country. He had details, total step-by-step plans of an enemy operation. And what do my Army officers do, what does the Defence Minister of India, Sardar Baldev Singh, no less, do. They laugh it off. Kalkat is a mad man or worse. A paranoid patriot. They do nothing”. Pointing at the fallen papers Nehru said”, There is the proof that every word that Kalkat spoke was true. We have the news now that ‘Operation Gulmarg’ has already started and raiders are entering Kashmir.

Major Kalkat was soon drafted into the Kashmir operations (1947-48) and saw operations in the difficult Tithwal sector. Kalkat had great political foresight too. He was mentioned for his leadership role in Kashmir operations in dispatches. His plan for settlement of refugees from Muzaffarabad in 1947 was widely appreciated but ignored by Pt. Nehru at the instance of Sheikh Abdullah.

Kalkat later commanded 14 Infantry in the Western Sector to recapture 32 posts from Pakistanis in Mamdot and Jalalabad sectors in the 1971 war. In the same war Kalkat and Major General BN ‘Jimmy’ Sarcar had initially commanded ‘Operation Jackot’ in the Eastern Sector. Kalkat also worked as Chief Military Intelligence Officer in the Cabinet Secretariat for two years. He wielded a facile pen. His brilliant account—’The far-flung frontiers’ (Allied, 1983) has attained the status of a classic.

Though Kalkat was approved for promotion as Lt. General, he sought voluntary retirement at the age of 54 in 1972. This great son of India passed away at Chandigarh on December 3, 2004 after a prolonged illness.

Source: Kashmir Sentinel

Tribal Raid 1947

Pakistan: “The Taliban’s Godfather”?

In Important documents on April 8, 2009 at 15:09

Pakistan: “The Taliban’s Godfather”?

Documents Detail Years of Pakistani Support for Taliban, Extremists

Covert Policy Linked Taliban, Kashmiri Militants, Pakistan’s Pashtun Troops

Aid Encouraged Pro-Taliban Sympathies in Troubled Border Region

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 227
Edited by Barbara Elias

 

For more information contact:
Barbara Elias – 202/994-7000
belias@gwu.edu

Unnamed and undated, this U.S. intelligence document confirms that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with both financial and military assistance.

 

 

 

 

Washington D.C.,  A collection of newly-declassified documents published today detail U.S. concern over Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban during the seven-year period leading up to 9-11. This new release comes just days after Pakistan’s president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, acknowledged that, “There is no doubt Afghan militants are supported from Pakistan soil.” While Musharraf admitted the Taliban were being sheltered in the lawless frontier border regions, the declassified U.S. documents released today clearly illustrate that the Taliban was directly funded, armed and advised by Islamabad itself.

Obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive at George Washington University, the documents reflect U.S. apprehension about Islamabad’s longstanding provision of direct aid and military support to the Taliban, including the use of Pakistani troops to train and fight alongside the Taliban inside Afghanistan. [Doc 17] The records released today represent the most complete and comprehensive collection of declassified documentation to date on Pakistan’s aid programs to the Taliban, illustrating Islamabad’s firm commitment to a Taliban victory in Afghanistan. [Doc 34].

These new documents also support and inform the findings of a recently-released CIA intelligence estimate characterizing Pakistan’s tribal areas as a safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists, and provide new details about the close relationship between Islamabad and the Taliban in the years prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Declassified State Department cables and U.S. intelligence reports describe the use of Taliban terrorist training areas in Afghanistan by Pakistani-supported militants in Kashmir, as well as Pakistan’s covert effort to supply Pashtun troops from its tribal regions to the Taliban cause in Afghanistan-effectively forging and reinforcing Pashtun bonds across the border and consolidating the Taliban’s severe form of Islam throughout Pakistan’s frontier region.

Also published today are documents linking Harakat ul-Ansar, a militant Kashmiri group funded directly by the government of Pakistan, [Doc 10] to terrorist training camps shared by Osama bin Laden in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. [Doc 16]

Of particular concern was the potential for Islamabad-Taliban links to strengthen Taliban influence in Pakistan’s tribal regions along the border. A January 1997 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan observed that “for Pakistan, a Taliban-based government in Kabul would be as good as it can get in Afghanistan,” adding that worries that the “Taliban brand of Islam…might infect Pakistan,” was “apparently a problem for another day.” [Doc 20] Now ten years later, Islamabad seems to be acknowledging the domestic complications that the Taliban movement has created within Pakistan. A report produced by Pakistan’s Interior Ministry and obtained by the International Herald Tribune in June 2007 warned President Pervez Musharraf that Taliban-inspired Islamic militancy has spread throughout Pakistan’s tribal regions and could potentially threaten the rest of the country. The document is “an accurate description of the dagger pointed at the country’s heart,” according to one Pakistani official quoted in the article. “It’s tragic it’s taken so long to recognize it.”

Islamabad denies that it ever provided military support to the Taliban , but the newly-released documents report that in the weeks following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, Pakistan’s intelligence agency was “supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food.” Pakistan’s Interservice Intelligence Directorate was “using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies into Afghanistan and to the Taliban forces.” [Doc 15] Other documents also conclude that there has been an extensive and consistent history of “both military and financial assistance to the Taliban.” [Doc 8]

The newly-released documents also shed light on the complexity of U.S. diplomacy with Pakistan as the State Department has struggled to maintain the U.S.-Pakistan alliance amid concerns over the rise of the Taliban regime. In one August 1997 cable, U.S. Ambassador Thomas W. Simons advises, “Our good relations with Pakistan associate us willy-nilly, so we need to be extremely careful about Pakistani proposals that draw us even closer,” adding that, “Pakistan is a party rather than just a mediator [in Afghanistan].” [Doc 24] In another 1997 cable, the Embassy asserts that “the best policy for the U.S. is to steer clear of direct involvement in the disputes between the two countries [Pakistan and Iran], and to continue to work for peace in Afghanistan.” [Doc 22]

As to Pakistan’s end-game in supporting the Taliban, several documents suggest that in the interest of its own security, Pakistan would try to moderate some of the Taliban’s more extreme policies. [Doc 8] But the Taliban have a long history of resistance to external interests, and the actual extent of Pakistani influence over the Taliban during this period remains largely speculative. As the State Department commented in a cable from late-1995, “Although Pakistan has reportedly assured Tehran and Tashkent that it can control the Taliban, we remain unconvinced. Pakistan surely has some influence on the Taliban, but it falls short of being able to call the shots.” [Doc 7]

Highlights

  • August 1996: Pakistan Intelligence (ISID) “provides at least $30,000 – and possibly as much as $60,000 – per month” to the militant Kashmiri group Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA). Despite this aid, the group is reaching out to sponsors of international terrorism including Osama bin Laden for additional support, and may in the near future become a threat to Islamabad itself as well as U.S. interests. HUA contacts have hinted they “might undertake terrorist actions against civilian airliners.” [Doc 10]
  • October 1996: A Canadian intelligence document released by the National Security Agency and originally classified Top Secret SI, Umbra comments on recent Taliban military successes noting that even Pakistan “must harbour some concern” regarding the Taliban’s impressive capture of Kabul, as such victory may diminish Pakistan’s influence over the movement and produce a Taliban regime in Kabul with strong links to Pakistan’s own Pashtuns. [Doc 14]
  • October 1996: Although food supplies from Pakistan to the Taliban are conducted openly through Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISID, “the munitions convoys depart Pakistan late in the evening hours and are concealed to reveal their true contents.” [Doc 15]
  • November 1996: Pakistan’s Pashtun-based “Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training; and when necessary – combat” alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. [Doc 17]
  • March 1998: Al-Qaeda and Pakistan government-funded Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA) have been sharing terrorist training camps in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for years [Link Doc 16], and HUA has increasingly been moving ideologically closer to al-Qaeda. The U.S. Embassy in Islamabad is growing increasingly concerned as Fazlur Rahman Khalil, a leader in Pakistan’s Harakat ul-Ansar has signed Osama bin Laden’s most recent fatwa promoting terrorist activities against U.S. interests. [Doc 26]
  • September 1998 [Doc 31] and March 1999 [Doc 33]: The U.S. Department of State voices concern that Pakistan is not doing all it can to pressure the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden. “Pakistan has not been responsive to our requests that it use its full influence on the Taliban surrender of Bin Ladin.” [Doc 33]
  • September 2000: A cable cited in The 9/11 Commission Report notes that Pakistan’s aid to the Taliban has reached “unprecedented” levels, including recent reports that Islamabad has possibly allowed the Taliban to use territory in Pakistan for military operations. Furthermore the U.S. has “seen reports that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance and military advisors.” [Doc 34]

Read the Documents
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Document 1 – [Excised] to Ron McMullen (Afghanistan Desk), “Developments in Afghanistan,” December 5, 1994, Unknown Classification, 1 p. [Excised]Just as the Taliban are emerging as a major player in Afghanistan, a source [name excised] is troubled over Pakistan’s deep involvement in Afghan politics and Pakistan’s evident role in the Taliban’s recent military successes. His concerns include, “that the GOP [Government of Pakistan] ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] is deeply involved in the Taleban take over in Kandahar and Qalat,” and that Pakistan’s efforts to further its agenda in Afghanistan will sabotage U.N. peace efforts currently being led by Mahmoud Mesteri, Special Envoy for Afghanistan for the U.N. Secretary General.

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Document 2 – Islama 00975
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Northern Afghan Strongman General Dostam Meets Taliban Representatives” January 29, 1995, Confidential, 2 pp. [Excised]

Unnamed Pakistani officials meeting in Islamabad with General Abdul Rashid Dostum in December 1995 allegedly advise Dostum to “not worry about the Taliban, because Pakistan can take care of them.” Dostum reportedly agrees to Pakistani requests of cooperation with the Taliban in opening trade routes in Afghanistan for Pakistan.

Dostum also meets with Taliban and Pakistani officials in Mazar-e-sharif in December. He is told by Taliban officials that they have “no territorial ambitions in the north and that Dostum should not oppose them.” Despite these promises, in May 1997 the Taliban would seize control of Mazar-e-sharif, taking Dostum’s properties and forcing him into exile.

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Document 3 – State 243042
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “A/S Raphel’s October 4 Meeting with Assef All on Afghanistan,” October 13, 1995, Confidential, 7 pp. [Excised]

Pakistan Foreign Minister Assef All tells U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphel that “the main Pakistani message to the [Rabbani] opposition was to unite against the Kabul regime, but not to attack Kabul.” Furthermore, “All did not deny that Pakistan had significant contact with and gave some support to the Taliban. However, he said that little outside material support was necessary as the Tall ban [sic] had widespread support throughout the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan.”

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Document 4 – Islama 09675
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Pakistan Afghan Policy: Anyone but Rabbani/Massoud – Even the Taliban,” October 18, 1995, Confidential, 6 pp. [Excised]

Pakistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan Qazi Humayun tells American officials in October that “Pakistan now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of backing the Taliban.” Pakistan’s already hostile relations with the Kabul-based Rabbani government had recently grown dramatically worse as an angry mob destroyed Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul in September, injuring Ambassador Humayun and killing one other Pakistani official. The Rabbani government in Kabul claimed the mob was holding Pakistan responsible for the Taliban take over of Herat. Humayun doubted such an angry and well-organized mob could form in Kabul, a city with weak ties to Herat, without being backed by the Rabbani government. In a separate document U.N. officials independently agreed with Humayun, claiming “the loss of that city to the Taliban could not have provoked any spontaneous outbursts.”

Although admitting to supporting the Taliban, Ambassador Humayun “opined that in many ways a Taliban government in Kabul would be even worse than the present one. Adding that a state under such ultra-conservative religious leadership would not make a good neighbor.”

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Document 5 – USUN N 004283
USMission USUN (New York), Cable, “Letter of GOP Permrep to SYG on Afghanistan,” November 1, 1995, Unclassified, 3 pp.

A reproduction of an October 25, 1995 letter from Pakistan’s U.N. representative to the U.N. Secretary General on Afghanistan, this cable is indicative of Pakistan’s public statements regarding its policy on Afghanistan. “We would like to once again reaffirm the continued neutral stance maintained by Pakistan in the Intra-Afghan rivalries. We continue to support the ongoing efforts of the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference for peace and conciliation in Afghanistan.” Pakistan maintains that it is neutral in Afghan politics.

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Document 6 – Islama 11049
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Russian Embassy Official Claims Iran Interfering more than Pakistan,” November 30, 1995, Confidential, 3 pp.

According to an unnamed official at the Russian Embassy in Pakistan, the Pakistani government continues to provide the Taliban with “modest financial assistance,” logistics support, fuel, military training and chooses to ignore a “booming smuggling trade – mostly electronics,” that creates huge profits for the Taliban. In spite of this support from Pakistan, the source claims the Taliban’s funding mostly comes from Afghan traders and that aid from Pakistan to the Taliban is much more conservative than aid from Iran to the Rabbani government.

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Document 7 – State 291940
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Discussing Afghan Policy with the Pakistanis,” December 22, 1995, Confidential, 11 pp. [Excised]

State Department officials in Washington D.C. question the wisdom of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy of supporting any group opposed to the Kabul-based Rabbani government, including backing the Taliban, a group that remains “an unknown quantity to many of Afghanistan’s neighbors and therefore much more frightening than the status quo.” Providing astute advice to the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, Washington advises “We see little likelihood the Taliban would be willing to transfer power to a transitional body acceptable to other Afghan powers. If so, then an unrepresentative Tajik [Rabbani] regime in Kabul will have been traded for an unrepresentative Pashtun [Taliban] authority. Although Pakistan has reportedly assured Tehran and Tashkent that it can control the Taliban, we remain unconvinced. Pakistan surely has some influence on the Taliban, but it falls short of being able to call the shots.”

Although “Pakistan has followed a policy of supporting the Taliban and [is] attempting to forge a military and political alliance among the Kabul regime’s opponents,” the U.S. does not support a Taliban takeover and is seeking to remain a more neutral player. Unfortunately a strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship has led “Tehran, Moscow and New Delhi [to] assume incorrectly that the U.S. is party to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and shares its antipathy for Rabbani and Masood…. Pakistani policy has undermined the credibility of our U.S. support of the U.N. special mission.”

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Document 8 – [Date and Title Unknown] Mori DocID: 800277
Secret, Noforn [Excised - Released by U.S. Central Command]

Unnamed and undated, this U.S. intelligence document confirms that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with both financial and military assistance, but speculates that because “Pakistan fears a complete Taliban victory may incite irredentist aspirations within its own Pashtun population [Pakistan] will likely attempt to pressure the Taliban into moderating some of its policies.”

Additionally, the document claims that Russia “has pledged to use military force should the Taliban push into northern Afghanistan,” and that India continues to supply weapons to anti-Taliban forces.

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Document 9 – Islama 01403
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Taliban Official Says Divisions Within Movement Growing; Predicts “Fight with Iran,”" February 19, 1996, Confidential, 8 pp. [Excised]

A Taliban official [name excised] discusses the Taliban perspective regarding Pakistani aid to their cause. Claiming Pakistan has only given the Taliban ammunition once, “at the very beginning of the movement in 1994,” the official explains that due to recent military successes resulting in the seizure of materials, including fuel and ammunition, the Taliban does not need direct supplies from the Pakistanis. He provided one important insight however, commenting that Pakistan “used Afghan traders to channel money to the Taliban, avoiding wherever possible a direct link with the movement.” Pakistan has previously denied providing the Taliban with large sums of aid, instead asserting the movement remained primarily supported by Afghan traders. This Taliban official implies that Afghan traders supporting the Taliban may actually only be serving as a conduit for Pakistani government funding.

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Document 10 – DI TR 96-008
Central Intelligence Agency, “Harakat ul-Ansar: Increasing Threat to Western and Pakistani Interests,” August 1996, Secret, 4 pp. [Excised]

Possibly in an effort to avoid being placed on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, Pakistan is withdrawing some of its monetary support to Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA), which the CIA describes as “as Islamic extremist organization that Pakistan supports in its proxy war against Indian forces in Kashmir.” The CIA is concerned over HUA’s recent increase in its use of terrorist tactics against western targets and civilians and its efforts to reach out to sponsors of international terrorism such as Osama bin Laden and Mu’ammar Qadhafi, who “may further encourage the group to attack US interests.”

ISID (Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligence Directorate) “provides at least $30,000 – and possibly as much as $60,000 – per month to the HUA,” but “antigovernment sentiment among HUA leaders is already strong and could grow further” if Islamabad further isolates the group by decreasing support. HUA’s recent shift from its limited focus on India to include western targets may indicate the group will also start to aim at Islamabad as “a senior HUA leader has publicly advocated an Afghan-style change of government in Pakistan that would remove the political, bureaucratic, and military hierarchies.”

One further interesting note in the document is that “HUA contacts of Embassy New Delhi have hinted that they might undertake terrorist actions against civilian airliners.”

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Document 11 – NID 96-0229CX
National Intelligence Daily, Central Intelligence Agency, Monday, September 30, 1996, Top Secret, 5 pp. [Excised]

Four days after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the CIA comments on the Taliban’s mixed policies regarding terrorist organizations operating in Taliban-controlled territory, noting that the “Taliban has tolerated some terrorist groups while shutting down others.” “Taliban has closed militant training camps associated with Prime Minister Hikmatyar, factional leader Sayyaf, and Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami. Taliban has not closed other camps associated with Usama bin Ladin, Hizbi Islami (Khalis), Paskistan’s Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam, and Harakat ul-Ansar, including the HUA’s main training camp in Khowst.”

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Document 12 – Peshaw 00916
U.S. Consulate (Peshawar), Cable, “Afghan-Pak Border Relations at Torkham Tense” October 2, 1996, Confidential, 6 pp. [Excised]

A “reliable contact of the consulate” [name excised] witnessed “30-35 sealed ISI trucks and 15-20 fuel tankers” waiting to cross the Afghanistan-Pakistan border at Torkham. “Between afternoon tea with the officers in charge of the ‘ISI convoy’ and recognizing the type of vehicle license plate numbers on the convoy vehicles, [name excised] was very certain of the convoy’s affiliation.” The cable does not specify what was contained in the ISI trucks or where after entering Afghanistan the convoy was heading.

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Document 13 – Islama 08637
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Foreign Secretary Mulls over Afghanistan,” October 10, 1996, Confidential, 2 pp.

Pakistan Foreign Secretary Najamuddin Shaikh insists that in spite of the rumors, Pakistani aid to the Taliban is not increasing and that Pakistan continues to push the Taliban to cooperate with other factions in Afghanistan rather than unilaterally conquer the country. U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Thomas W. Simons comments that the Foreign Secretary “went to great pains to reassure us that Pakistan is not throwing its chips in with the Taliban. In any case, [the U.S.] will continue to urge Pakistan to avoid the temptation of siding with the Taliban, but instead work to persuade the Taliban that a durable peace is possible only through genuine national reconciliation involving all Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious groups.”

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Document 14
Privy Council Office (PCO) [Ottawa, Canada] [Released by the U.S. National Security Agency], “IAC Intelligence Assessment – IA 7/96,” “Afghanistan: Taliban’s Challenges, Regional Concerns, October 18, 1996,” Top Secret – SI, Umbra, 12pp. [Excised]

A Canadian intelligence document released by the National Security Agency summarizes the situation in Afghanistan a month after the Taliban takeover of Kabul and accurately projects that the Taliban’s recent acquisition of the capital “could now more starkly divide [Afghanistan] into two distinct parts – Pakistan-supported Pushtun/Taliban forces in control of Kabul and most of the country, and Tajik/Uzbek/Shia forces of Dostam, Masood, and the Hezb-i-Wahdat’s Karim Khalili in the Panjshir Valley and north.”

Pakistan is isolated in its support of the Taliban advance, as “there is clear signs that, aside from Pakistan, Afghanistan’s near neighbors – Russia, Iran, India, and the Central Asian countries – harbour real concerns over the regional impact of the Taliban’s accession to power.” However, even Pakistan “must harbour some concern” regarding the Taliban’s impressive capture of Kabul, as it may diminish Pakistan’s influence over the movement and may over time produce a Taliban regime in Kabul with strong links to Pakistan’s own Pashtuns, perhaps eventually calling “for creation of a ‘greater Pushtun nation.”

To India’s dismay, Kashmiri militants will likely be encouraged by the Taliban’s recent successes, as many “see their struggle as much in a religious as seccessionist [sic] perspective.”

The Top Secret SI, Umbra classification designates the information in the document originating from highly-sensitive communications intelligence. UMBRA is the highest-level compartment of Special Intelligence (SI). For more information see previous Archive posting, “The National Security Agency Declassified”.

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Document 15
From [Excised] to DIA Washington D.C. [Excised], Cable “[Excised]/Pakistan Interservice Intelligence/ Pakistan (PK) Directorate Supplying the Taliban Forces,” October 22, 1996, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]

This U.S. Intelligence Information Report concludes that the ISI is much more involved with the Taliban than Pakistani officials have been telling U.S. diplomats. U.S. intelligence indicates that the ISI “is supplying the Taliban forces with munitions, fuel, and food. The Pakistan Interservice Intelligence Directorate is using a private sector transportation company to funnel supplies into Afghanistan and to the Taliban forces.” Although food supplies from Pakistan to the Taliban are conducted openly, “the munitions convoys depart Pakistan late in the evening hours and are concealed to reveal their true contents.” The document does not comment on whether Pakistani officials have been concealing this information from the U.S. or if the ISI, Pakistani intelligence, has been keeping its support of the Taliban hidden from other Pakistani government offices, in effect causing Pakistani diplomats to pass along false information to the U.S.

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Document 16 – Islama 001054
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Pakistan Counterterrorism: Ambassador’s Meeting with [Excised] on State Sponsor Designation,” February 6, 1997, Secret, 1 p. [Excised]

The U.S. Embassy confronts an unnamed Pakistani official on the unsettling triangle possibly developing between Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA), Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. Both bin Laden and the HUA have been granted sanctuary in Afghanistan and are linked with terrorist training camps in Khost, near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan. The U.S. fears there could be “a linkup between HUA, an organization Pakistan supported and bin Laden; it could have very serious consequences.”

The Pakistani official replied that the “HUA had been under very strong scrutiny for “more than a year,” and there had been “positive progress” in monitoring and controlling its activities. The HUA, he maintained, was under “enough control” that its activities would not create problems for Pakistan. Similarly he continued, “we won’t allow our territory to be used by Osama bin Laden for such activities.”" According to the official, Islamabad is in control and the ISID (Inter-services Intelligence Directorate) does not operate in Afghanistan on a separate agenda that is independent of Islamabad’s policies.

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Document 17
From [Excised] to DIA Washington D.C., “IIR [Excised] Pakistan Involvement in Afghanistan,” November 7, 1996, Confidential, 2 pp. [Excised]

Similar to the October 22, 1996 Intelligence Information Report (IIR), this IIR reiterates how “Pakistan’s ISI is heavily involved in Afghanistan,” but also details different roles various ISI officers play in Afghanistan. Stating that Pakistan uses sizable numbers of its Pashtun-based Frontier Corps in Taliban-run operations in Afghanistan, the document clarifies that, “these Frontier Corps elements are utilized in command and control; training; and when necessary – combat. Elements of Pakistan’s regular army force are not used because the army is predominantly Punjabi, who have different features as compared to the Pashtun and other Afghan tribes.”

According to the document, Pakistan’s Frontier Corps provide some of the combat training in Kandahar or Herat provided to Pakistani madrassa students that come to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban. The parents of these students apparently know nothing regarding their child’s military involvement with the Taliban “until their bodies are brought back to Pakistan.”

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Document 18 – Islama 09517
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, “Afghanistan: Taliban Deny They Are Sheltering HUA Militants, Usama bin Laden,” November 12, 1996, Confidential, 7pp.

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Thomas W. Simons Jr. and the Taliban’s “Acting Foreign Minister,” Mullah Ghaus discuss the presence of Osama bin Laden and Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA), Kashmiri-based anti-India militants training in Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. Responding to media reports that HUA militants are training in “two camps vacated by “Afghan Arab” militants in Afghanistan’s Paktia (Khost) province near the Afghan-Pakistan border, and intelligence reports that bin Laden “is in or near the Taliban-controlled city of Jalalabad, in Nangarhar province,” Ambassador Simons expresses strong concern that the Taliban seemingly are developing policies to shelter terrorists. Ghaus flatly denies that HUA militants or bin Laden are in Taliban territory, “There are no foreigners in Khost province – only Taliban,” and “bin Laden was invited to Afghanistan by (Hezb-I-Islami Leader and ousted Prime Minister) Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar left Kabul when we took it over. Maybe bin Laden went with him,” “I assure you that [bin Laden] is not in areas controlled by Taliban administration. This is an objective of our movement.”

Ghaus insinuates that the Taliban would be more willing to do something about terrorist entities operating in Afghanistan if the U.S. provided them with funding.

According to The 9/11 Commission Report (pp. 63-65) when bin Laden first returned to Afghanistan in May 1996 he maintained ties to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar as well as other non-Taliban and anti-Taliban political entities. However by September 1996 when Jalalabad and Kabul had both fallen to the Taliban, bin Laden had solidified his ties to the Taliban and was operating in Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. Furthermore the 9/11 Commission Report observes that, “it is unlikely that Bin Laden could have returned to Afghanistan had Pakistan disapproved. The Pakistani military intelligence service probably had advance knowledge of his coming, and its officers may have facilitated his travel… Pakistani intelligence officers reportedly introduced bin Laden to Taliban leaders in Kandahar, their main base of power, to aid his reassertion of control over camps near Khowst, out of an apparent hope that he would now expand the camps and make them available for training Kashmiri militants.”

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Document 19 – Islama 009994
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, “Afghanistan: British Journalist Visits Site of Training Camps; HUA Activity Alleged,” November 26, 1996, Confidential, 4pp.

An unnamed British journalist reports to the U.S. Embassy that her visit to two terrorist training camps in Paktia province, near the Afghan-Pakistan border on November 14, 1996 revealed that both camps appear occupied, and her “Taliban sources” advise that “one of the camps is occupied by Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) militants,” the Pakistan-based Kashmiri terrorist organization. Whether or not HUA’s presence in training camps in Afghanistan is known or supported by Islamabad or Pakistani intelligence is not commented on in the document. The reporter’s sources inform her that the other camp is occupied by “assorted foreigners, including Chechens, Bosnian Muslims, as well as Sudanese and other Arabs.”

____________________________________________

Document 20 – Islama 00436
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, “Scenesetter for Your Visit to Islamabad: Afghan Angle,” January 16, 1997, Confidential, 12pp. [Excised]

A background document for an upcoming visit of Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Robin Raphel, the cable summarizes the political and military state of affairs in Afghanistan. Pages 7-9 address Afghan-Pakistan relations, concisely observing that “for Pakistan, a Taliban-based government in Kabul would be as good as it can get in Afghanistan.” As Pashtuns opposed to India, the Taliban permit Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA) the Kashmir-based militant anti-Indian group to use Taliban-controlled military training camps in Khost near the Afghan-Pakistan border. The document observes that Islamabad probably understands that supporting the Taliban increases the strength of extremist Muslim political movements within Pakistan, but “probably believes the Taliban will eventually become more moderate,” and considers the overall extremist issue “a problem for another day.”

Regarding support, “Pakistani aid to the Taliban is more significant and probably less malign than most imagine.” Military aid is probably moderate, “consistent with the Pakistani military’s budget realities,” and that military advice “may be there, but is probably not all that significant since the Taliban do quite well on their own.” On the other hand, “Pakistani political and diplomatic support is certainly significant,” as sources have informed the U.S. Embassy that Islamabad plays an “overbearing role in planning and even executing Taliban political and diplomatic initiatives.” Pakistan also grants the “Taliban free access to the Pakistani market to buy whatever they want, including subsidized wheat flour. This is an enormous advantage over the other factions” fighting for political control in Afghanistan.

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Document 21 – Islama 01873
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, “Official Informal for SA Assistant Secretary Robin Raphel and SA/PAB,” March 10, 1997, Confidential, 13pp. [Excised]

Updating Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robin Raphel on the situation in Afghanistan, the Embassy advises that fighting is more than likely to continue as Iran and Russia continue to supply Ahmed Shah Massoud in the north, while “Pakistan appears to be reviewing its Afghan policy, but important agencies, such as ISID [Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate], still appear committed to and even supportive of a Taliban victory.

The Taliban continue to protect Osama bin Laden, although “some high-level Taliban say they would send him to Saudi Arabia if it would accept him.” Furthermore, the Taliban “appear to have worked out some sort of deal – perhaps brokered by the ISID – that allows Harakat-ul-Ansar, the Kashmiri militant group, to use camps in Khost, and they have not followed through on a promise to allow a U.S. team to visit these camps.”

The Embassy recommends a policy of “limited engagement to try to “moderate and modernize” the Taliban.” Full engagement would be against American interests as it would associate Washington with a “movement we find repugnant,” however a failure to engage the Taliban at all would further isolate Afghanistan.

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Document 22 – Islama 02001
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan and Sectarian Violence Contribute to a Souring of Pakistan’s Relations with Iran,” March 13, 1997, Confidential, 16 pp. [Excised]

Discussing the detrimental impact of Pakistan’s support for the Taliban movement in Afghanistan on Pakistan’s relationship with Iran, American officials conclude “the best policy for the U.S. is to steer clear of direct involvement in the disputes between the two countries [Pakistan and Iran], and to continue to work for peace in Afghanistan.” Providing a history of strained relations between the nations over Afghanistan, the document comments that “Pakistan has consistently denied that it is the Taliban’s godfather, although GOP [Government of Pakistan] officials in private sometimes acknowledge that they have close links and are providing them with foodstuffs and fuel.”

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Document 23 – Islama 06882
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Pakistanis to Regulate Wheat and Fuel Trade to Gain Leverage Over Taliban,” August 13, 1997, Confidential, 9 pp. [Excised]

Partially as an effort to gain more leverage over the Taliban, but also as a means to restrain drug trafficking and increase revenue, Pakistan has placed stricter regulations on wheat and fuel trade with Afghanistan and plan to demand hard currency in exchange for wheat instead of accepting “powder,” or drug payments. Although Pakistani officials claim that these new regulations are an effort to exert greater influence the Taliban, Pakistan continues to unilaterally back the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. U.S. officials inquiring into the selling of Pakistani wheat in areas of Afghanistan not controlled by the Taliban are told, “the GOP [Government of Pakistan] is only dealing with the Taliban,” and that Pakistan’s “objective is not political, but economic and narcotics-related.”

Note: the document refers to regulating wheat and POL trade. POL stands for Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants.

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Document 24 – Islama 007343
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: [Excised] Briefs Ambassador on his Activities. Pleads for Greater Activism by U.N.” August 27, 1997, Confidential, 5 pp. [Excised]

(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting, “The Taliban File Part III”, March 19, 2004.)

The source for this information remains excised throughout the document, but describes efforts to encourage multi-ethnic negotiations in Afghanistan that would work towards establishing a durable peace in the region. Pakistan urges the U.S. to back the “vacant seat policy,” regarding Afghan representation at the U.N., and Taliban representatives Mullah Hassan and Mullah Jalil promise the source that if U.N. Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi returns to Afghanistan, Mullah Omar will meet with him, but due to “the schedule” he was not able to meet with Brahimi during his most recent trip.

According to the source, the Massoud-led anti-Taliban alliance is weak and “if the Taliban would simply cease all military activity, the alliance would fall apart.” He later adds that the Taliban will successfully take over the country, but “when faced with the challenge of governing the entire country, [the Taliban] will yield to technocrats.”

U.S. Ambassador Thomas W. Simons admits that “Pakistan has a ‘privileged association’ with the Taliban, but not control over them; Iran, and perhaps Uzbekistan and Russia have similar privileged associations with other parties to the conflict. But where does that lead us in terms of practical steps?” The Ambassador advises, “Our good relations with Pakistan associate us willy-nilly, so we need to be extremely careful about Pakistani proposals that draw us even closer. For, at the second level, Pakistan is a party rather than just a mediator.” Regarding Pakistani aid to the Taliban, the Ambassador shows little interest in discussing the accuracy of the 20 million rupee estimate given by the ISI, responding that such a figure “did not include access to Pak wheat and POL [Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants], or the trucks and busses full of adolescent mujahid crossing the frontier shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ and going into the line with a day or two of training.”

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Document 25 – United Nations Outgoing Code Cable – Special Mission U.N.SMA (U.N. Special Mission to Afghanistan), “Present Pakistani Initiatives in Afghanistan” October 30, 1997, [Classification Unknown], 3 pp.

(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting, “The Taliban File Part III”, March 19, 2004.)

Head of U.N. special mission to Afghanistan (U.N.SMA) Norbert Holl and Pakistan’s special envoy on Afghanistan, Iftikhar Murshid, discuss a meeting between Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Mullah Rabbani, a senior-ranking Taliban official. The Prime Minister gets Rabbani to agree to a collective meeting of the various warring factions in Afghanistan, and declares it a breakthrough as Rabbani didn’t insist on addressing the POW issue before meeting. Murshid is less optimistic, as “the POW issue had always come up in the final instance and that therefore omitting it at this time should not be overestimated.”

Pakistan is pressuring the U.S. and U.N. to vacate the anti-Taliban alliance from Afghanistan’s U.N. seat. Holl feels Pakistan would never agree to an oil embargo against Afghanistan, even though such an embargo is a proposed step intended to compel cooperation among the Afghan factions, something Pakistan claims to support. Although the Taliban’s supplies of POL, (Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant supplies) are subsidized by Saudi Arabia, Holl believes “Pakistan would never agree to impede the POL transit.” Rather than isolate the Taliban in order to endorse compromise, “GOP [Government of Pakistan] would sign a new contract with the Taliban today, 30 October, for the supply of 600,000 tons of wheat.”

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Document 26 – Islama 01805
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: [Excised] Describes Pakistan’s Current Thinking” March 9, 1998, Confidential, 9 pp. [Excised]

(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting, “The Taliban File Part III”, March 19, 2004.)

In a March 9, 1998 meeting between the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad’s Deputy Chief of Mission Alan Eastham and a source who appears to be Pakistan Foreign Ministry official Iftikhar Murshed, the officials review several Afghan-related issues including U.S. concerns over Osama bin Laden’s recent fatwa. The U.S. embassy is concerned over Pakistan’s connection to bin Laden’s statement, as the fatwa was signed by Fazlur Rahman Khalil, a leader in Pakistan’s Harakat ul-Ansar (HUA). The source claims Iran is a great influence in northern Afghanistan, while “downplaying the Pakistani leverage on the Taliban.” He maintained that the Taliban has “more than enough ammunition,” and “no arms and ammunition from the Pakistani government have gone over the border in the past three or four months.”

Even though the source claims “Pakistan has ‘little leverage over the Taliban,’” he provides the State Department with some of its first details on how “Pakistan was in the business of providing arms-related supplies to the Taliban… [and] could refuse to provide the Taliban fuel since the Taliban load up their planes in Pakistan.” Pakistan provides support to the Taliban, but has little, if any control over their actions. “If Pakistan held up wheat consignments to the Taliban, the Taliban would say ‘what the hell! We can smuggle enough wheat into Afghanistan to feed ourselves.’”

According to the source, Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan can be controlled by Pakistan if the Pakistani government chooses to do so, as “Pakistan, in the past, has shown that it can control this border. In fact, there are only just over 40 “jeepable” border crossing points. These points could be monitored if the Baluchistan and the North-West frontier provincial governments got serious about the issue of smuggling.”

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Document 27 – Islama 004546
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, “Afghanistan: [Excised] Criticizes GOP’s Afghan Policy; Says It Is Letting Policy Drift,” June 16, 1998, Confidential, 2 pp

(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting, “The Taliban File Part III”, March 19, 2004.)

A Pakistan government source who is “a longtime and bitter political opponent of [Pakistani Prime Minister] Nawaz Sharif” laments on the lack of a firm “sense of direction” in Pakistan’s Afghan policy and the failure of the Pakistani government to take serious efforts to control its border with Afghanistan. According to the source, who appears to be former Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar, “the Bhutto government’s efforts in regard to Afghanistan could be criticized on many fronts, but “at least the policy was coherent – we tried to build the Taliban up and then tried to push them to negotiations (in October 1996) after they captured Kabul.” Under the “Nawaz Sharif government, there has never been a sustained effort to bring the factions to the bargaining table.”

The source “personally supported the deployment of ISI officers operating out of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, and from Herat, Kandahar, and the Jalalabad consulates.” By operating out of these diplomatic posts, the government of Pakistan could better monitor the activities of the ISI in Afghanistan. He suggests that ties between Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns are strengthening, which may pose a threat to the continued sovereignty of Afghan government in Kabul.

Although the source is biased against Nawaz Sharif the document notes that his points nevertheless “reverberate because they have been underscored by more neutral observers who agree that the present government is letting its Afghanistan policy drift. The result is confusion as evidenced by the GOP’s [Government of Pakistan's] declaratory policy, which is in favor of negotiations, and a countervailing policy of ISI support for the Taliban.”

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Document 28 – Islama 05010
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Bad News on Pak Afghan Policy: GOP Support for the Taliban Appears to be Getting Stronger” July 1, 1998, Confidential, 2 pp. [Excised]

(Previously released and included in previous Archive posting, “The Taliban File Part III”, March 19, 2004.)

According to a variety of Pakistani officials and journalists, including Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan has “regressed to a point where it is as hard-line as ever in favor of the Taliban.” Pakistani government officials have given up “the pretense of supporting the U.N. effort,” and have become unabashedly pro-Taliban. The Pakistani government, including the Prime Minister, recently approved six million dollars in additional aid to the Taliban over the next six months. The U.S. considers the additional funding a regressive step as the “trend-line had generally been in a more positive direction.”

Rashid reports that he heard comments from Pakistani officials arguing that “the Taliban are capable of taking over all of Afghanistan; their regime is qualitively (sic) better for the Afghan people than that of their opponents; [and] the outside world should try to understand the Taliban mind-set before condemning them on such issues as human rights etc..” Such opinions are echoed by another Pakistani source whose name is excised in the document, “If it were not for the war, the Taliban would be making progress on women’s issues. They would be making such progress now, but the U.N. has failed to help them, despite Taliban requests.” The same source also commends the Taliban for bringing stability to Afghanistan while explaining how “the Northern Alliance is totally unreliable. They refuse to keep their word.”

The cable speculates the spike in pro-Taliban Pakistani feeling can be attributed to the political fallout of recent nuclear testing and increased regional tension. These developments have increased Pakistan’s need for a pro-Pakistan, anti-India regime in Kabul.

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Document 29 – Islama 05535
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “In Bilateral Focussed (sic) on Afghanistan, GOP Reviews Pak/Iran Effort; A/S Inderfurth Expresses U.S. Concerns About the Taliban” July 23, 1998, Confidential, 16 pp. [Excised]

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Shamshad Ahmed discusses joint Pakistan/Iran talks on the peace effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. During the meeting, “Ahmed denied that the GOP [Government of Pakistan] is providing anything but “oil and wheat” to the Taliban. In addition, he asserted that the type of assistance that was given by Pakistan to the Taliban was also provided [to] the northern factions.”

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Document 30 – Islama 005964
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Evidence Not There to Prove Assertions that Pak Troops Have Been Deployed to Assist Taliban in the North,” August 6, 1998, Confidential, 5 pp. [Excised]

There is no evidence to support claims that recent Taliban military victories are the result Pakistani troop participation in Taliban battles. Members of the Northern Alliance told the U.S. Embassy that it “was inconceivable that the Taliban could ‘do it all on their own,’” but U.S. efforts to substantiate these claims failed to produce supporting evidence. Although the participation of large numbers of Pakistani troops seems unlikely, it remains possible that Pakistani military advisors were involved in training Taliban fighters. Taliban ranks furthermore continue to be filled with Pakistani nationals (an estimated 20-40 percent of Taliban soldiers are Pakistani according to the document), which further solidifies Pakistan-Taliban relations, even though this does not indicate not outward or official Pakistani government support. Osama bin Laden is mentioned as supporting pro-Taliban Arab fighters from an office in Herat.

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Document 31 – Islama 07242
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Tensions Reportedly Mount Within Taliban as Ties With Saudi Arabia Deteriorate Over Bin Ladin,” September 28, 1998, Secret, 8 pp. [Excised]

Primarily discussing the Taliban’s firm opposition to surrender Osama bin Laden and Saudi Arabia’s recently failed attempts to negotiate bin Laden’s expulsion from Afghanistan, the document concludes with the following thoughts from U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan William Milam, “If Pakistan – the Taliban’s closest international supporter – throws in its weight behind Saudi Arabia on the bin Laden issue, the pressure on the Taliban may become unbearable. As of this time, Pakistan has not yet made its position clear.”

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Document 32 – Islama 01320
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, “Afghanistan: Taliban Seem to Have Less Funds and Supplies This Year, But the Problem Does Not Appear to be that Acute,” February 17, 1999, Confidential, 2 pp. [Excised]

Suffering under sanctions imposed in response to nuclear weapons testing in May 1998, Pakistan has reduced aid to the Taliban, although sources indicate Pakistan “continued to write a check worth a million or so dollars every couple of months.” This decrease in support is not a political move by Pakistan, but appears to be a purely budgetary decision. Unlike certain other documents on Pakistan aid to the Taliban, this cable reports that there is little evidence of direct military aid from Pakistan to the Taliban, as Pakistan only admits to sending flour and fuel.

Additionally Saudi Arabia, concerned over the Taliban’s sheltering of Osama bin Laden, has been successful in reducing private Saudi donations flowing into Afghanistan. However the Taliban, through their access to drug trafficking, income from transit taxes, and continued, although limited support from Pakistan as well as the “capture of a fair amount of equipment during their successful late 1998 military campaign,” does not seem to be in any immediate trouble from the recent decrease in funding from Pakistan. The cable also mentions that Osama “bin Ladin has also provided the Taliban with some money, but probably not enough to make a significant difference in their case balance.”

The Taliban’s main opponent, Ahmed Shah Masoud continues to be very well funded, from Iranian, Russian, Uzbek and Tajik sources and although the Taliban show no immediate sign of weakening from the drop in funding, U.S. Ambassador Milam notes that “slight variations in funding and supplies can mean the difference between victory and defeat” in such small-scale, low-tech conflicts such as the war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban.

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Document 33
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl F. Inderfurth to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, “Pushing for Peace in Afghanistan,” March 25, 1999 [approx], Secret, 6pp.

Despite diplomatic approaches, continued fighting in Afghanistan is likely as Pakistan continues to provide aid to the Taliban in their quest for complete control of Afghanistan, while Iran and Russia support Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Northern Alliance. Pakistan’s alliance with the Taliban is stronger than Iran or Russia with Masoud as “Iran and Russia are more likely to end diplomatic and covert support to Masood than Pakistan would be to end its support to the Taliban.”

The document portrays a slightly stronger Pakistan-Taliban alliance than previous declassified State Department materials. Pakistan not only provides aid to the Taliban, but “will continue to seek and support a Taliban military victory.” Pakistan is an isolated country in international dealings on Afghanistan. The UN’s informal “Six-Plus-Two” group overseeing efforts to diffuse the conflict in Afghanistan includes the six nations with borders along Afghanistan – China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – as well as the two mediating powers Russia and the U.S., but according to the document may as well be changed to an “”Eight Minus One” (Pakistan) process, emphasizing the isolation of Pakistan.”

Furthermore, “Pakistan has not been responsive to [American] requests that it use its full influence on the Taliban surrender of Bin Ladin.” The Department believes “that Pakistan can do more, including cutting POL supplies that mostly flow into Afghanistan from Pakistan.” “Continued Pakistani resistance and/or duplicity” may lead the U.S. to push for U.N. Security Council involvement, or for the inclusion of India in the “Six-Plus-Two” negotiations.

Current U.S. policy towards Afghanistan consists of supporting diplomatic approaches such as “Six-Plus-Two,” and doing what is possible to moderate the behavior of the Taliban. “At the end of the day, we may have to consider the Taliban to be an intrinsic enemy of the U.S. and a new international pariah state. We are not there yet and we do not want to be there. We will continue our policy of trying to mitigate Taliban behavior where and when its ill advised policies cross our path.”

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Document 34 – State 185645
U.S. Department of State, Cable, “Pakistan Support for Taliban,” Sept. 26, 2000, Secret, 4pp. [Excised]

Responding to reports that Islamabad may be allowing the Taliban to use territory in Pakistan for military operations, in September 2000 an alarmed U.S. Department of State observes that “while Pakistani support for the Taliban has been long-standing, the magnitude of recent support is unprecedented.”

In response Washington orders the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad to immediately confront Pakistani officials on the issue and to advise Islamabad that the U.S. has “seen reports that Pakistan is providing the Taliban with materiel, fuel, funding, technical assistance and military advisors. [The Department] also understand[s] that large numbers of Pakistani nationals have recently moved into Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban, apparently with the tacit acquiescence of the Pakistani government.” Additional reports indicate that direct Pakistani involvement in Taliban military operations has increased.

In an effort to promote a cease-fire and discourage Pakistan from continuing its efforts to support a military solution to the conflict in Afghanistan by arming the Taliban, Washington candidly states that the U.S. will not accept a Taliban military victory in Afghanistan, but clarifies that the U.S. is “not divorced from reality,” recognizing that a solution must be found through a broad-based peace process which includes all relevant Afghan political factions, including the Taliban. The U.S. does not “believe that Masood is the answer.”

Note: This document is cited in The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 6, Footnote 68 as “DOS cable, State 185645, “Concern that Pakistan is Stepping up Support to Taliban’s Military Campaign in Afghanistan,” Sept. 26, 2000.”

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Document 35
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford, Jr. to Secretary of State Colin Powell, “Pakistan – Poll Shows Strong and Growing Public Support for Taleban,” November 7, 2001, Unclassified, 3pp [Excised]

A poll compiled by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research after September 11, 2001, but before the commencement of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, shows the Pakistani public has become more pro-Taliban than it was before the September 11 attacks. As the Musharraf government begins to implement policies distancing Pakistan from its longstanding alliance with the Taliban, the Pakistani public is becoming more sympathetic to the Taliban.

The Tashkent declaration 10th February 1966

In kashmir on January 1, 2009 at 07:32

The Tashkent declaration 10th February 1966
The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India and Pakistan hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.
(i) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo Pakistan subcontinent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

(ii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February, 1966, to the position they held prior to 5 August, 1965, and both sides shall observe the ceasefire terms on the ceasefire line.

(iii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of each other.

(iv) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

(v) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse.

(vi) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade relations, communications as well as cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing agreements between India and Pakistan.

(vii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

(viii) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating to the problems of refugees and evictions/illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agree to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

(ix) The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed that the two sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels of matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognised the need to set up joint IndianPakistani bodies which will report to their governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan record their feelings, deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to witness this declaration.

Prime Minister of India President of Pakistan
Lal Bahadur Shastri Mohammad Ayub Khan

Tashkent, 10 January 1966.

SHEIKH ABDULLAH’S INTERVIEW WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 7TH FEBURARY 1948

In kashmir on November 14, 2008 at 07:46

SHEIKH ABDULLAH’S INTERVIEW WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON 7TH FEBURARY 1948.
[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorized recipient and not passed on]
Cypher/OTP
DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)
FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)
No. 390 D. 2.25 p.m. 9th February, 1948
9th February, 1948 P. 8.18 p.m. 9th February, 1948
Repeated to High Commissioner New Delhi,
; High Commissioner Karachi
Washington Saving,
MOST IMMEDIATE

TOP SECRET
Addressed to For eign Office telegram No. 390 of 9th February repeated for information to High Commissioner New Delhi and High Commissioner Karachi and Saving to Washington.
Following for C.R.O. from Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
My immediately preceding telegram. Following is account of interview. [Begins]
At the request of Gopalaswami Ayyengar the Secretary of State interviewed Sheikh Abdullah on February 7th.
2. Secretary of State started by making it clear that Kashmir situation was one in which he was quite impartial and that his only concern was to stop the fighting and to introduce measures whereby the people would be given opportunity to express their views as to their future in a free and fair manner. Secretary of State pointed out that the importance of a settlement was matter of world interest since war on sub-continent of India would involve some 400 million people and would not only be disastrous for the people of India and Pakistan but to the world in general and to Asia in particular. World interest in the matter was therefore very considerable and opinions were being formed as a result of debates in the Security Council.
3. Sheikh Abdullah by producing all the arguments he had used in his speech of 5th February to the Security Council. He laid particular stress on his own position in Kashmir as the chosen leader of the people in their fight for freedom and said that local insurgents and his party were all fighting with the same object. He denied hotly that there had been any killings in Kashmir before October and laid whole blame for events on action of Pakistan Government. He invited neutral observers to go to Kashmir and to report whether his contentions regarding Pakistan Government were correct or not. His only solution to the problem was that Pakistan Government should be called upon to remove tribesmen. Thereafter Indian forces in Kashmir would suppress the local insurgents (he actually used the word ‘suppress’) and would organize elections for a new representative Government which would then organize and run a plebiscite. He ridiculed and suggestion that an impartial administration might be necessary to carry out a plebiscite.
4. In course of further discussion it was pointed out to Sheikh Abdullah that his solution to the problem involved further fighting in Kashmir to “suppress” the revolt of the local insurgents and that it would probably provoke war with the tribes of the North West Frontier and perhaps between India and Pakistan. His retort was “let there be war”. He evaded answering the direct question “against whom are the local insurgents fighting”?
5. On returning again to the question of how fighting could be stopped Sheikh Abdullah gave the unconstructive answer “give Kashmir to Pakistan now”. The Secretary of State replied “even that would be better for India and more advantageous for her than that she should enter on a war the consequences and result of which are unforeseeable”. Sheikh Abdullah quickly twisted his own answer as being the answer of the Secretary of State to the problem and said “you think this would be a nice solution”. The Secretary of State corrected him and pointed out exactly what he said in reply to Sheikh Abdullah’s statement. Sheikh Abdullah however again returned to this allegation in further conversation.
6. Since further discussion was producing nothing constructive the interview was ended by the Secretary of State restating his position as given paragraph 2 above. Sheikh Abdullah’s attitude throughout was completely uncomprising and his parting words, announced in a somewhat hostile manner were “we shall hold a plebiscite under conditions laid down by ourselves”. [Ends]
Foreign Office please repeats to United Kingdom High Commissioner New Delhi and Pakistan as my telegrams Nos. 58 and 42 respectively.
[Advance copies sent to Duty Officer C.R.O. and Cypher Section C.R.O. for repetition to United Kingdom High Commissioners New Delhi and Pakistan].

&n bsp; COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
* Date of initiation of this message is February 1948, i.e. initial stages of war in the former disputed State, consisting areas of Gilgit, Baltistan, Laddakh, Muzaffarabad, Vale of Kashmir, Riyasi, Poonch, Jammu, Kathua. Sheikh is stressing rightly on removal of tribesmen but has given confused statements on suppression and purpose of “Local Insurgents”. Local insurgents are most probably the freedom fighters in Gilgit-Baltistan Laddakh and so called Azad Jammu Kashmir. The Shiekh has displayed a confused mind in 1947-48, lacking originality. * The flatterers of the group of Sardar Qayyum say, “Kashmir will become (Banaiga) Pakistan”. But, they do not explain as to how? Similarly, the Nationalists say, former State of BJK will become independent. But, they do not adequately explain as to how, short of militancy? Can they give out the basics of the dispute in terms of political geographical boundaries, political administrative units at the time of dispute and in future, the ongoing South Asian / international status of the disputed regions, interim administrations responsible to work till final resolution of the dispute and what all is relevant and discarded in the UN concerned documents?
* UNCIP and UN Resolutions, connected correspondence and treaties on the former disputed State concluded under UN charter, ought to be wholesomely read and understood thoroughly by the intellectual and nationalists of BJK to turn the tables against the occupational, enslaving and criminal presence of the Govts of Pakistan and India. India, Pakistan and the World agreed once upon a time on it in 1948 and now both the Govts are running away from it, especially Govt of Pakistan on Gilgit-Baltistan issue. Only few additions are required in UNCIP Resolutions for the freedom and dignity of the oppressed people of BJK.
* Mr Javed Inayat’s demand of restoration of BJK Army is a very heartening and welcome sign. Offcourse, this is given out in UNCIP correspondence. It should be BJK Army, because J&K Army in Bolor should not be an occupational army. It will take time to arrive at a mutually agreed single identity. In the meantime BJK identity should work for the people of divided and disputed former State.
* It is being authentically heard that the Prime Minister of Pakistan is in the very near future going to Gilgit-Baltistan to announce a political package there. It is said to be envisaging upgrading so called Northern Area Legislative Council (not a single legislation carried so far) to Northern Area Legislative Assembly. Besides, it is said that the advisors of the non-local Chief Executive will be enjoying the status of provincial ministers. This is all fraud, another lollypop and an anesthesia. The Govt of Pakistan should know that it is high time that they must setup a complete and genuine local Authority Govt in Gilgit, as accepted by themselves and the UN. The Chief Executive should be a local elected member and army rule must finish from there. Everybody concerned should minutely monitor the Prime Minister of Pakistan’s forthcoming visit to Gilgit-Baltistan.

LOOK AT THE SUBSTANDARD.

Islamist Movements and a Political Challenge: An Alternative Perspective

In kashmir on November 5, 2008 at 14:44

Islamist Movements and a Political Challenge: An Alternative Perspective
While on a recent visit to Delhi, I chanced upon an Urdu book whose title, Tehrik-i-Islami Ko Darpesh Siyasi Challenge (‘The Political Challenges Before the Islamic Movement’), immediately attracted my attention. Yogi Sikand presents a summary of this book.

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Written originally in Arabic by a leading Arab Islamist ideologue, Mustafa Muhammad Tahan, it is, as I discovered as I leafed through it, an interesting appeal for redefining and reappraising Islamist politics. Given the ongoing debates about Islamist politics, I felt that Tahan’s views on the subject needed to be more widely known. Hence, I undertook to summarise the basic arguments of the book in the form of this article.

Born in Lebanon in 1938, Tahan is a post-graduate in chemical engineering from the University of Istanbul, Turkey, where he played an important role in the Turkish Islamic students’ movement. He was also one of the founders of the International Islamic Federation of Students’ Organisations (IIFSO), set up in 1969, being appointed as its General-Secretary in 1980. Editor of a bi-lingual English and Arabic magazine, Tahan has authored numerous books on the Islamic movements in Arabic, many of which have been translated into other languages.

The Urdu version of Tahan’s Arabic text on Islamist politics, translated by Dr. Muhammad Sami Akhtar of the Department of Arabic, Aligarh Muslim University, and published in 1998 by Hilal Publications, Aligarh, extends to almost two hundred pages. Tahan sees the Islamist movement as a global phenomenon, speaking of it in the singular. This, of course, is not quite the case. Yet, he is not unmindful of the diversity of perspectives and policies within the broader Islamist camp itself, and it is precisely to these inner divergences that much of his attention is devoted.

Although Islamist groups share common ideological moorings, basing themselves on the Quran and the Traditions or Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, and, for the most part, advocate the cause of an Islamic state based on the Islamic law (shariat), differences have emerged among them over various issues related to policies and ‘methods of working. Of particular importance here are matters related to the use of violence, the question of women and the rights of minorities. The chief merit of Tahan’s book is that rather than ignoring these contentious issues or glossing them away, it deals with them head-on, not hesitating to critique certain groups for what are seen as serious lapses on their part.

I am aware of the considerable differences of views within what Tahan calls the global Islamic movement, and would perhaps not agree with him on referring to it as one. However, since the intention here is to present Tahan’s views rather than to critique them, I have chosen to describe the phenomenon as he does.

In his close involvement with the Islamic movement, first in Turkey, and then as a functionary of the International Islamic Federation of Students’ Organisations, Tahan, he tells us in the introductory chapter of his book, was confronted with several questions of crucial import, which, he felt, had not been given the attention they deserve by Islamist ideologues. His book, he says, was written with the primary purpose of addressing some of these issues, to bring about more clarity in Islamist circles. The questions that this book deals with are as follows:

1. Does Islam allow for the existence of political parties?

2. Is preaching (dawat-o-irshad) the only path that can lead to peace for the Muslim community (ummah)?

3. Is it that the political path, on the other hand, can lead only to division and strife and cause the ummah to stray away from God?

4. Does Islam allow for Muslims to adopt the parliamentary path, given that those who adopt this path have to take an oath on the Constitution and law of their country, which are considered by some to be ‘un-Islamic’?

5. Is it possible to co-operate with secular forces and systems that do not abide by the Islamic law?

6. Is it possible to participate in the governance of a country in co­operation with secular political parties?

In this regard, Tahan mentions that certain leading Islamist ideologues are of the opinion that setting up of political parties is not an appropriate means for Islamic groups to strive to acquire political control. In their view, the path that the Holy Prophet Muhammad had adopted was that of ‘invitation’ (dawat), ‘preaching’ (irshad) and ‘revolution’ (inqilab).

However, Tahan notes, there are many other opinions on the subject. Some assert that Islam forbids the setting up of political parties. Others believe that the entire world today is an ‘abode of war’ (dar-ul harb). Yet others insist that violence can have no place. Each group accuses the other of misinterpreting Islam, and so engages in a war of fatwas against the rest.

Tahan laments this sorry state of affairs, and points to the futility of the dissensions among the various Muslim groups. He says that the early Muslims had adopted the path of ‘invitation’ and ‘preaching’, of ‘oneness’ and ‘unity’, but today the community is torn by mutual recriminations and internecine conflict. In this context, he pleads for a renewal in and reawakening of the community as a task that urgently needs to be undertaken.

Tahan locates the growing inner conflict in Muslim activist ranks to the 1950s and ’60s in the context of the growth of other competing ideologies such as Secularism, Liberalism, Marxism and Nationalism, on the one hand, and what he calls the ‘intellectual stagnation’ in Muslim ranks, on the other. To begin with, he says, these various ideologies competed with each other and with Islam in a ‘free, civilised and progressive’ manner, but the situation drastically changed when military coups occurred in many Arab and Muslim countries and harsh dictatorships replaced the earlier regimes. Political parties were banned and all democratic rights were seriously curtailed. This situation created a wave of fear and terror among the masses. At this time, says Tahan, it was only the Islamist groups which mobilized popular opposition to the regimes in power. As more people began being attracted to Islamist groups, Tahan writes, other forces began an earnest attempt to discredit them. He says that it is in this context that the growth of ‘extremism’ (intiha pasandi) among certain Islamist groups must be understood. He sees this development as a ‘conspiracy’ hatched by forces inimical to the Islamic cause.

The aim of his book, says Tahan, is to discuss the many challenges that contemporary Islamist movements are face-to-face with. He divides these into the following categories:

1. The Political Challenge
Tahan cautions Islamic activists that this challenge is immense and must be clearly and seriously considered. ‘Without fully understanding the political context’, Tahan says, ‘Islamic groups cannot attain their goals’.

2. The Democratic Challenge

This centres on issues such as human rights, freedom, political factionalism, democratic elections, political parties, political alliances and the role of women in political affairs. Tahan notes that these issues have not been properly thought out by Islamic scholars, who, he says, have little acquaintance with social realities. Such important issues, he writes, need to be carefully understood in the light of ‘wisdom’ (hikmat), the teachings of religion and knowledge of the affairs of the contemporary world. This requires ‘knowledge’ as well as awareness of ‘truth’, ‘pragmatism’ and understanding of the dictates of the shariat. Unfortunately, he says, many Islamists have failed to appreciate this and so have ‘fallen victim to extremism’, so much so that ‘this has given force to the argument of the anti-Islamic forces that Islam and terrorism are synonymous’.

3. The Extremist Challenge

Tahan bitterly critiques those who ‘claim to be lovers of Islam’ but who at the same time insist that ‘violent extremism’ is an integral part of the Islamic Call, arguing that Islam allows for the spilling of innocent blood, which they label a jihad. He says that this argument is completely ‘false’, and that it has ‘rendered irreparable damage’ to the Islamist movements, more so, in fact, than the efforts of the ‘anti-Islamic’ forces.

Tahan also mentions in passing the other challenges that he sees Islamist groups today having to contend with, including Western imperialism, growing regionalism and racial, sectarian and ethnic conflicts and the problem of ethnic and religious minorities.

Islamist movements are active today in many countries, notes Tahan. Some of them are local or regional in their scope, while others are global. Despite their common agenda, there appears to be a lack of understanding among many of them. While some do work in tandem with similar groups, others believe that they alone are on the ‘true path’ and go to the extent of branding others as ‘disbelievers’ (kafir).

At the outset, Tahan clearly says that he does not wish to get involved in this controversy, for, he says, he believes that the ‘global Islamic movement’ is broad enough to include ‘all individuals and groups working for the cause of Islam’. He describes it as encompassing all groups which are local, regional as well as international, every government agency working for spreading Islamic awareness, organisations involved in providing social services to Muslims, Islamic political parties, Islamic students’ movements and Sufi groups engaged in Islamic missionary work. It is not linked to any particular school of thought (maslak), nor is it the ‘monopoly’ of any particular community, sect or group.

In this context, Tahan forcefully rebuts the claims of some Islamic groups that they alone are true followers of Islam and are thus the only true representatives of the Muslims. He notes with dismay the fact that ‘by and large’ the mutual relations between different Islamic groups are characterised by conflict and suspicion. Tahan pleads for these groups to ‘open their hearts wide to one another’. He sees the root cause of this conflict in ‘groupism’ (asabiyyat) and ‘prejudice’, which can only be overcome through good-will and fear of God. He points out that differences between different groups on minor matters of the interpretation of Islam (furui masail) are but natural, while they all agree on the basic elements of the faith. Differences on minor matters, he argues, should in no way come in the way of reaching a broader unity and understanding between different Muslim groups, for all Muslims are united by a common faith in Islam. When differences arise they need to be sorted out through discussion and dialogue in an environment of ‘sincerity, brotherhood and love’. The various Islamic groups should try to sort out their differences, not magnify them, and should not let divergences on matters of jurisprudence (fiqh) and sect lead to internecine conflict.

Tahan says that divergences on jurisprudential affairs are ‘natural’, but these should not be used as a pretext to spread hatred and conflict or spawn new sects on this basis. Islam, he says, allows for freedom of thought and ‘holds knowledge and those who possess it in the highest esteem’. Hence, he argues, all differences should be settled on the basis of a free exchange of ideas. He says that differences may continue to exist even after that, but, despite this, the various Islamic groups should remain united on the basis of their common aims.

In this regard, Tahan warns Islamic activists that they must desist from hurling accusations and false allegations against each other. Issuing fatwas of disbelief against each other must be strongly resisted, for, Tahan says, Islamic activists are ‘missionaries’ (dais), not judges (qazis)’. Islamic groups must reform their attitudes and policies vis-a-vis each other and appreciate the fact that all groups and individuals working for the progress and spread of Islam have their legitimate space. They must also begin to cooperate with one another on maters of mutual concern. For this purpose, they must form a common platform and a common advisory body (shura), through which important issues concerning Muslims can be debated, after which common policies can be adopted by them all. In the absence of such consensual means, says Tahan, it is impossible for the Islamic groups to attend the objectives that they are working for.


The Aims of the Islamist Movement

Most contemporary Islamist movements, notes Tahan, came into existence in the early twentieth century, particularly after the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, in place of which a secular, Westernising regime came to power in Turkey. At this time, Western imperialist powers were effectively in control of almost all Muslim and Arab lands, and in order to consolidate their rule, they aggressively promoted a process of Westernisation, particularly through the educational system. Students from these countries went for their higher education to Western countries, where deeply influenced by such ideologies as Secularism, Liberalism and Socialism. On their return home, they ardently propagated the view that the development of their countries was possible only through a complete adoption of Western culture and by abandoning Islam. It was in this context and as a response to this challenge that the contemporary Islamic movement emerged, Tahan writes.

One of the basic aims of Islamist movements, Tahan says, is to restore to the Muslims their lost confidence and to instill in them a love for and pride in Islam and a spirit of activist dedication to the Islamic cause, for which they would be ready to sacrifice their all. Another principal objective of the Islamist movements, as they emerged in the 1950s, was to liberate Muslim lands from Western imperialism. Such groups thus played an important role in liberation struggles against European colonial powers in Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Nigeria, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, etc..

The Political Challenge

Tahan notes that among the various Islamic groups active in the world today, there are some which completely shun political involvement as ‘the snare of the devil’, and focus, instead, simply on personal piety. He sees this as a form of escapism which has no sanction in Islam, and as only helping strengthen those forces that stand to gain from the status quo, such as ruling elites in Muslim countries and their Western masters. Islam, says Tahan, covers every aspect of a believer’s personal as well as social life, and this includes politics as well. There is no contradiction between worship (ibadat) and politics (siyasat)’ in Islam, so he argues.

Given this understanding of Islam as a comprehensive or total way of life, it was but natural that Islamist movements would face fierce opposition from ruling regimes as well as conservative religious elements. While the former tried to suppress them by force, the latter, says Tahan, attempted to counter their growing influence by hurling accusations against and fuelling suspicions about them. In this way, the conservative religious establishment was used by the ruling regimes to
at bolster their authority and to stave off the challenge that the Islamist movements posed at the political level.

To be actively involved in political affairs, as Islamist movements are, says Tahan, in no way means that the cultural intellectual and spiritual dimensions of the Islam are ignored. Rather, he says, all these are to be found in right measure in what he calls a ‘balanced Islamic movement activist’. In other
words, the Islamic agenda is not, as some allege, simply a means to grab political power in the name of religion. A true Muslim is necessarily political, says Tahan, for he must have a clear understanding of the problems of the Muslim community and must constantly be concerned with solving them.

Many books have been written on the issue of Islam and politics, but, Tahan notes, some basic issues of contemporary concern are yet to be explored in these writings. He says that one reason for this is that Muslim scholars have committed the’ mistake of ‘going beyond the limit’ in searching for parallels in Muslim history, and have failed to mould those past parallels and principles in the light of the present-day context. ‘So sacrosanct have they considered past thinking that they want to recreate that in its entirety today”, without attempting to refashion that thought in the light of the contemporary situation. In this way, he says, many Islamist ideologues have failed to present the Islam as a political system capable of meeting the challenges of changing times and conditions. What is needed, he says, is to draw’ inspiration from the past, but, at the same time, to view the models of the past in their own specific historical contexts. The inspiration from the past must be ‘balanced with a realistic understanding of present-day realities’ in order to fashion a political system that can respond to changing conditions ‘on the basis of debate, research, renewal and reform’, he stresses.

The Islamic political system that Tahan proposes is based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for the rule of law. The responsibility of the ruler is to implement the laws of Allah. He is answerable to the Muslim community, which has the right to guide him if he goes astray or even to remove or replace him if he fails to fulfill his responsibilities. The ruler is assisted by a council of advisors. Political parties, including organized opposition parties, would be allowed to exist and function,
freedom of expression and political rights for all would be guaranteed and the state’s attitude towards issues like women’s rights, the distribution of wealth, economic policies, etc., would be
clearly spelled out.

In this regard, Tahan says that there are some crucial questions that Islamic scholars must urgently seek to grapple with:

1. What is the definite structure of the Islamic political system?

2. What are its unique characteristics that set it apart from other political systems?

3. To what degree do other political systems share features in common with that of Islam?

4. Can the Islamic political system take advantage of human experience?

5. What is the role of the consultative body in the-Islamic political system?

6. What role does shura play in the election of the ruler and in solving the problems of the Muslim community?

7. What conditions apply to the ruler of the Islamic state?

8. How is he chosen?

9. Will he be elected for life or can he also be removed from office?

10. What are his rights and responsibilities?

11. What are the foundations of governance and political activity in the Islamic state?

12. What is the relation between the judiciary, executive and the ruler in the Islamic state?

13. How can a political culture be developed that will enable people to be ‘politically trained’ so as to develop a comprehensive understanding of social and political affairs?

14. How can a climate of freedom of expression, constructive criticism and dialogue be developed in order to bring into being this political culture?

The Islamic political system is based on ‘politically conscious’ Muslims nurtured in an ideal political culture, Tahan says. Islamic political consciousness, he opines, is based on a deep understanding of historical and contemporary events and situations, critical insight and a passionate commitment to change conditions, win freedom and solve the many problems that afflict society.

The Challenge of Democracy

Democracy, notes Tahan, has been denigrated and condemned in much Islamist literature in recent times. It is presented as a system wherein it is the people themselves who make their own laws, while in Islam the actual law-maker is God. Hence, several Islamist activists forcefully argue that democracy is a ‘kafir system’.

Tahan seeks to critically examine this position, without, he says, attempting to ‘distort Islam’ or to promote Western thought or to project what others have called as ‘Islamic Democracy’ or ‘Islamic Liberalism’. He writes that there are only two systems of governance in the contemporary world: democracy and dictatorship. In the former, human beings and protection of their rights occupy a place of central importance, while in dictatorships there is no such consideration for the individual’s rights. In such a context, asks Tahan, what should the position of Islamist activists be?

.

Tahan sees democracy, insofar as it champions basic human rights, human freedom, parliamentary elections, existence of opposition parties, freedom of dissent, political participation of women, protection of and equal rights and opportunities for religious and ethnic minorities, the possibility of peaceful change of governments and peaceful coexistence between different political parties and communities, as similar in many respects to Islam. Tahan’s conception of democracy sharply contrasts with the sort of ‘democracy’ that the West has sought to impose in Muslim and other ‘third-world countries. He bitterly critiques the West for its hypocrisy on the issue of democracy and human rights, seeing these as mere slogans used to bolster Western hegemony over the rest of the world. What happened to the West’s claims to championing democracy and freedom, he asks, when it conquered lands in Asia and Africa and shed the blood of millions in the name of its ‘civilising mission’? Can the West’s protestations about democracy be at all taken seriously when it spares no efforts to bolster pro-Western dictatorial regimes in the Muslim world, to crush all attempts at challenging such regimes, and to defend Israel, which has forced an entire people out of their own homeland? Where, he questions, were the Western champions of Democracy when the election results in Algeria, which brought the Islamic opposition to power with a thumping majority, were suddenly annulled by the country’s military dictators? Did not the West whole-heartedly support this, and then go on to assist the Algerian authorities to crush the Islamist movement with brutal force, resulting in the tragic death of thousands of innocent people?

Tahan sees no contradiction between his understanding of Islam and the basics of ‘true democracy’, as he defines it. He sees the confusion about the relation between the two as having much to do with the West’s apprehensions of its control over the Muslim world being increasingly challenged through political participation by Islamic groups. He writes that as Islamic political parties began participating in elections, as in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Turkey and Tunisia, and rapidly grew in popularity and strength, the West, fearful of its loosening stranglehold on Muslim countries, began a propaganda crusade against Islam, branding it as an enemy of democracy, and, at the same time, promoted wrong, world-renouncing interpretations of Islam that see Islam as prohibiting Muslims from participating in elections or even to ‘think about politics’. How can Islamic groups be seen as challenges to democracy in the Muslim world, asks Tahan, when almost all the governments in these countries which they are struggling against are themselves brutal anti-democratic dictatorships bolstered up by an equally anti-democratic West? Most Islamist groups, he notes, are themselves fighting for human rights and political freedoms, which are the cornerstones of democracy.

Since many Muslims want to be governed by Islam, says Tahan, democracy demands that they be allowed to do so and that Islamic political systems be established in Muslim-majority countries where the majority of the populace wants to live under an Islamic political dispensation. In the light of this, he says there is no contradiction between the Islamic movement and the majoritarian rule principle that is the foundation of democracy as it is generally defined. The concept of shura or consultation is a central one in Islam, he says, and it is a mechanism that allows for people’s participation in governance. The Quran, he notes, enjoins upon Muslims to settle their affairs through mutual consultation. The principle of shura is binding on all, including even the head of the state and the leaders of the Islamist movements. For this it is essential that political parties, including the opposition, be allowed to freely function.

Tahan then discusses in detail certain basic principles of democracy and Islam to see where they differ and where they agree. Basic human rights, a cornerstone of democracy, Tahan says, are clearly spelled out in the Quran and the Hadith, the sayings of and reports about the Prophet Muhammad. Islam upholds the dignity of Man as a creature of God. The Quran repeatedly stresses that Muslims should abide by the rules of justice and piety, and refrain from evil and oppression. Every human being, irrespective of religion or ethnicity, Tahan says, is dear to God. God has granted all people the same basic faculties so that they can all play their role in the construction and development of society. Likewise, God has also given all people certain basic human rights, which are not a favour bestowed on them by any worldly ruler that can be snatched away at will. Rather, these rights are inherent to human beings and have been clearly laid down in the Islamic shariat.

Tahan here reminds his readers that Quran insists ‘There is no compulsion in religion’. This lays the foundation for religious freedom, and in this way, says Tahan, the religion and religious susceptibilities of non-Muslims are protected. ‘No Muslim has the right to mock the religious beliefs or laws of non-Muslims’, he declares, adding that ‘In Islam every person qua human being is worthy of respect’. A non-Muslim living in an ‘Islamic system’ is ‘under the protection of Islam’, and so ‘must be given equal protection’ unless he commits such a heinous crime that merits the withdrawal of such protection. As creatures of the one God and as children of the same primordial parents, Adam and Eve, all people, Tahan writes, deserve respect as human beings, whichever religion they might happen to follow. This principle of respect for life should inspires Muslims to crusade ‘against every oppression’ and to protect life, for to save one human life from wanton killing is like saving the entire, humankind. As the Quran says, the wrongful killing of just one person is tantamount to killing the whole human race. Islam calls for freedom of thought and for education for all. On the economic front it calls for the protection of the rights of the poor. In this regard, the large-scale violations of human rights in many Muslim countries, says Tahan, has nothing to do with what he sees as normative Islam. To the contrary, it owes itself to wrong interpretations of Islam or to ignoring the commandments of Islam altogether.

Human Rights and the Islamic Movement

Given the centrality of human rights in Islam, Tahan says that it is of ‘urgent importance’ that Islamist groups clearly spell out their stand on the subject and then act on those principles. Islamists, Tahan insists, must extend freedom of thought and freedom to enjoy human rights to all. No person, says Tahan, can be denied his basic human rights simply because of his beliefs or views or because he is a political opponent. Islamic groups must under no circumstances support dictatorial regimes that heap oppression on the masses and resort to slaughtering their opponents. An important question in this regard is the proper attitude of the Islamic groups vis-a-vis other forces who are also in the forefront of the struggle for the promotion of human rights. Tahan mentions in this context the instance of the. Prophet Muhammad, who instructed some of the early Muslims of Mecca to seek refuge from the persecution of the Quraish by migrating to Christian Ethiopia, because the king of Ethiopia, although not a Muslim, was a just ruler. This suggests, he notes, that Muslims can indeed cooperate with other people of goodwill in crusading against oppression.

One of the most complex issues in the human rights debate relating to Islam is the position of non-Muslims in an ‘Islamic state’. Tahan says that there are clear instructions about the issue in the Quran and in the Traditions of the Prophet. He refers here to the pact that the Prophet signed with the non-Muslims of Medina which formed an integral part of the constitution of the first ever Islamic polity. Under the terms of the pact, the non-Muslims were entitled to full protection and were assured that they would not face any harm. ‘In the light of this’, Tahan writes, in an ideal ‘Islamic state’ non-Muslims and Muslims both would ‘enjoy the same citizens’ rights’. There would be no discrimination on the basis of religion in social and political affairs. For, Tahan says, the Quran itself explicitly lays down that Muslims are to deal with justice with all, except for the oppressors and tyrants. Allah, the Quran says, ‘loves those who are just’.

Islam and freedom go together, Tahan asserts. Islam, he goes on to add, supports religious and political freedom, including freedom of thought. Religious freedom in Islam is based on the Quranic commandment: ‘There is no compulsion in religion’. Individual and communities can only be really free, Tahan’ says, when they are free from external, military, political or economic oppression. Islam calls for a fine balance between personal freedoms and the rights of social groups. Since freedom is so central to Islam, says Tahan, no true Muslim can ever support a despot or a dictator who has no concern for human rights. Significantly, in this regard he laments the fact that some Islamist groups have actually done that. Tahan sternly warns Islamists against allying with dictators who wish to use them to bolster their own fragile legitimacy. Tahan considers the issue of people’s participation in governance to be a vital one, and one which, he says, Islamist movements must seriously examine and clarify their position on. They must, he says, make it clear that they cannot under any condition support dictatorial and repressive regimes.

Islamist groups must be concerned about the freedoms of not just Muslims alone but of all people, says Tahan. Writing at a time when apartheid was still official policy in South Africa, he appeals to the Muslims to support the struggle of the blacks there for a just society, even though, as he notes, most South African blacks are non-Muslims. Muslims, he says, must speak out and struggle against oppression irrespective of the religion or ethnicity of the victims, for that is a duty binding on them by Islam. This is why, he says, that while the Jews were for centuries persecuted in Christian Europe, they found peace and security in Muslim lands.

Tahan contrasts the normative teachings of Islam on human rights and freedom with the pathetic state of affairs in much of the Muslim world today, where, he notes, the masses are, for the most part, cruelly denied many basic rights by regimes that are supported by the West. Likewise, he regrets that some Islamist groups do not believe that their opponents, too, should be able to enjoy rights and freedoms. ‘No movement can genuinely claim to be an Islamic one until it grants personal and social rights to all irrespective of colour or race’, he insists.

The Will of the People

One of the basic underlying principles of democracy is ‘live and let live’, says Tahan. This means that all citizens of the state, irrespective of religion and race, are entitled to equal treatment. Their views must all be taken into account, and all political, social, cultural and other problems must be settled through a process of dialogue. In the political sphere, this means that people subscribing to different views are freely allowed to express them and mobilise public support for them, enabling them to influence policy-making through the politics of the ballot-box. In Islam, the people have the right to choose their own ruler, who is considered to be a mere deputy (naib) of the people. Citizens can oversee and, if necessary, critique his actions. In this sense, he Tahan writes, Islam does not oppose the basics of democracy, provided the political system is based on the fundamental principles of Islam and its law, the shariat. In such a system, all human rights are fully protected, and the fundamental duty of the state is to ‘promote virtue and combat vice’.

Tahan writes that some ulema oppose such a form of rule as, they argue, it gives rise to ‘groupism’ and ‘factionalism’ and, in the process, undermines the unity of the Muslim community. Elections, they say, are based on each candidate hailing his own virtues and denigrating his opponents. Contrarily, some other ulema hold that such a system is indeed in conformity with Islam, and argue that the fact that although such a system may not have been in existence in its entirety in the past, as long as it does not entail anything that is clearly forbidden (haram) in Islam, it is permissible. This system, they believe, is a suitable way to implement the decisions of consultation (shura), keep a watch on the ruler, uphold human rights and basic freedoms, maintain the stability of the polity and clamp down on terrorism. Several advocates of this view believe that the Islamist movements must attempt to mobilise public opinion in their favour before acquiring political power. In this way, they admit to the possibility of cooperation with secular forces to attain their aims.

Separation Between Religion and Politics

In the dominant Western political discourse, religion and politics are considered to be two completely separate domains, and religion is treated as a purely personal affair, having no bearing on political life. How should Islamists relate to groups and individuals who advocate such a position? Tahan writes that an ‘Islamic state’ must, of necessity, be based on Islamic law, because Islam does not accept the division between religion and politics. The Islamic political system does not allow for laws to be passed in violation of the shariat, but it does give the people the right to choose their own ruler, someone known for his honesty, piety and wisdom, whose responsibility shall be to rule, for a fixed term, in accordance with Islam, and in consultation with members of the democratically elected consultative body. This system provides guarantees for the freedom of all non-Muslim minorities. Political differences within the parameters laid down by the shariat, says Tahan, are to be accepted as ‘natural’, and they can be sorted out through peaceful dialogue. Thus, the Islamic system accepts the existence of multiple political parties free from control by the state, provided they all accept the Islamic law as their constitution. The system allows for political competition between these parties and for the peaceful transfer of power from one party to another through free and fair elections. After all, says Tahan, historically, Islam has accepted the existence of several Muslim schools of jurisprudence and so multiple political parties may be similarly accepted.

A system that clamps down on political parties and stifles freedom, Tahan writes, ‘is an oppressive dictatorship’, which ‘must be stiffly opposed’. Many Islamist movements, he says, are veering round to the view that multiple political parties must be accepted and that differences among them as regards programmes and policies ‘may actually be a blessing for the community’. Multiplicity of political parties does not mean that Islam allows for ‘groupism’ to flourish, as the basic aim of such parties should be the service of Islam and not the pursuit of personal or parochial worldly interests. In this context, he notes, Islamist groups in some countries have entered into agreements with secular democratic parties in pursuit of common ends, principally in their struggle against oppressive regimes.

The issue of non-Muslim political parties is also one that Islamist groups must contend with. The ‘Islamic state’, says Tahan, allows for non-Muslim minorities full rights and protection, including the right to vote, to carry on with their political activities and to set up their own associations, including political parties. Tahan writes that Islam allows for Muslims to cooperate with non-Muslims for the welfare of the society at large. He adduces as an instance, in this regard, the example of the
Prophet Muhammad, who headed a group, the hulf-ul fuzul along with the non-Muslims of Mecca to help the oppressed and the poor.

Some ‘extremists’, Tahan notes, have condemned parliamentary elections as un-Islamic, but they represent only a fringe minority. Islam actually insists that the views of the community must be taken into account by the ruler through their elected representatives. The representatives of the people should not put themselves forward for election, however. Only such persons who are trustworthy, learned, experienced and pious Muslims with leadership qualities are fit to be elected as people’s representatives. The election process must be governed by basic Islamic morals and norms, and there should be no room for false propaganda and bribery.

Several Islamist parties have, Tahan notes, participated in, parliamentary elections, as in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Kuwait, Yemen Sudan, Malaysia and Pakistan. By taking part in the electoral process, Islamist parties, he writes, will be, able to keep a check on the ruling party, struggle for a peaceful transfer of power, present the Islamic message and programme to the public and strive to uphold Islamic rulings and principles inside Parliament. For this they can join hands with other, even non-Islamic, parties for common ends. Islamic parties are, he says, ‘a. democratic force’, and thus must address themselves to the general public, and one way to do so is by participating in elections.

Tahan notes that several Islamist groups insist that there is no point in participating in elections held under the auspices of an ‘un-Islamic’ regime on the grounds that this would only further entrench the existing system. They point to the recent examples of Algeria and Turkey, where Islamist political parties entered the electoral fray and were poised to win impressive victories but were forcibly prevented from coming to power by Western-backed regimes. Tahan recognises a certain validity in these arguments, but says that ‘there is no other political course open to us’. Terrorism as a way out of this impasse, he says, is a ‘destructive course’, harmful for all, including the army, the people and the Muslim community as a whole.

Political Differences

The ‘Islamic state’, says Tahan, allows for all citizens to freely express their views. In such a situation it is but natural that differences will arise. Since freedom, equality and justice are the pillars of the Islamic order, the Islamic political system must accept the existence of political differences. Differences in matters of the detailed interpretation and application of the minor details of the Islamic laws (furui masail) are also but to be expected. Differences among the ulema may emerge because, being humans after all, they differ in their powers of understanding of various issues. Factors such as historical context also play a role in conditioning such differences. Given this, says Tahan, it is understandable that consensus may not be able to be arrived at on all matters. Hence, such differences must be accepted and accommodated, and should not become the cause of conflict and prejudice. Differences among the ulema on points of law can be sought to be overcome through debate and dialogue in a spirit of ‘love’ and ‘understanding’. Many Islamist groups have come to realise the need to respect and tolerate such differences, Tahan writes.

Several Islamist movements, Tahan laments, have attempted to forcibly suppress or even crush differences of opinion, some of them even having resorted to violence for this purpose. This, Tahan says, is because they ‘have not truly appreciated the import of differences in their true spirit’. Early Islamic history, on the other hand, provides numerous examples of how Muslim leaders allowed differences of opinion to be expressed. To accept the opinions of others when they are proved correct, says Tahan, is ‘a civilized and Islamic principle’, be it within the home and family or in politics. Rebutting the charge that this would encourage dissent and factionalism within the Islamist movements themselves, he says that the actual causes of ‘groupism’ within the movements are ‘egoism’, the ‘dictatorial mentality’ and the belief that no one but oneself or one’s party represents the truth.

Islamist movements, Tahan advises, must respect the opinions of their members, allow them to freely and fearlessly express their views, whether supportive or critical, and take them into consultation. Constructive criticism and respect for the views of others, says Tahan, is a must for the progress of these movements and of society at large. He alludes to several instances in the life of the Prophet Muhammad which clearly suggest that even among the early Muslims there were times when different opinions were articulated. The Prophet, he says, encouraged his followers to freely express their views, even though some differed from the others. In Islam, this respect for different views is given practical expression in the form of shura or consultation, through which the ruler takes decisions guided by the advice of others, he points out. Dissenting opinions are allowed to be aired and a decision is finally arrived at after weighing all views, in a search for the truth. The ideal Muslim ruler is not a dictator who rules according to his whims. Rather, he is guided by shura in his responsibility of implementing the rulings of the shariat. Muslims are to follow their ruler only insofar as he rules by the shariat, but not if he transgress it.

Blind following of the leader is sternly condemned in Islam, says Tahan. Rather, such obedience should be based on careful analysis, understanding and critical thinking. Obedience does not mean that the people cannot question the actions of their ruler. Tahan criticises those Islamist activists who, in the name of discipline and obedience, have resorted to ‘enormous crimes’ and ‘destructive actions’. He argues forcefully for the need for respecting differences and inner democracy within Islamist movements. This tolerance for different opinions, says Tahan, extends even to non-Islamic groups, who, in an Islamic state, are allowed to express their position, provided this is done peacefully and without in any way challenging the Islamic law. By thus accommodating differences, Islamist movements can pave the way for the establishment of a just political system, Tahan contends.

Acquisition of Political Power

The context for the emergence of contemporary Islamic movements was provided by the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 and Western imperialistic control over almost the entire Muslim world. Islamic movements emerged in various countries in Asia and Africa, seeking to liberate them from colonial rule and establish states ruled according to Islamic law. Some such movements chose to adopt peaceful preaching as a means to mould and build up public opinion in their favour and to then acquire political power, while others stressed that power should be immediately acquired at all costs, even through resorting to violent means, seeing Western-style democracy as a hollow sham designed to protect the interests of a small ruling class. By resorting to indiscriminate violence, Tahan notes, these groups have not only inflicted grave damage to the people but have also worked against their own long-term interests. Allying themselves with dictatorial regimes, or being inspired by their example, some groups styling themselves as ‘Islamic’, he notes, ‘turned to supporting the oppression of the people in the name of Revolution’. Armed insurrections generally cause much avoidable loss of life and suffering on a mass scale, and in this way, Tahan writes, ‘are not much different from military take-overs’.

Tahan is critical of some ‘Islamic’ groups who, in their quest for power, have resorted to extremism and terrorism in the name of jihad. This is no jihad, however, says Tahan, and in no way is it a service to Islam, either. On the contrary, it has given Islam a bad name, with Islam being sought to be equated with terror by those opposed to it. It has strengthened the opponents of the Islamists, and has given ruling regimes an excuse to clamp down on Islam in the name of weeding out ‘terrorism’. Hence, Tahan advises, Islamic groups must clearly announce that they have no link whatsoever with indiscriminate violence and the targeting of innocent people. To kill one innocent person, says the Quran, is tantamount to killing the entire human race, he tells his readers. Violence may, however, be resorted to, he says, in the struggle against oppressive regimes, when other means have been explored and have failed and if the political system forcibly denies any space to Islamic groups to function. Tahan here warns against the violence descending into indiscriminate killing of innocents or even into a war between different contending Islamic groups attempting to settle their scores, as in the case of Algeria, Syria and Afghanistan, where, he says, because of the continued violence, ‘the words jihad and mujahidin have caused humanity to hang its head in shame’. This has greatly weakened the Islamic movements, as a result of the loss in this spate of violence of thousands of Islamist cadres and by discrediting the movements in the eyes of many. It has also resulted in wide-scale destruction of property.

While Tahan insists that Islamic groups must continue to seek to acquire political power, he argues that the path forward is not that of armed revolt or terror and indiscriminate killing, but of democratic means of persuasion and preaching, which, he says, are in harmony with the spirit and teachings of Islam. This entails building up Muslims of ‘genuine Islamic character’, he says. Change must begin with the individual, strengthening his or her faith and commitment to Islam, for, as the Quran says, God does not change the conditions of a people until they begin to change themselves. From the home the movement progresses to society at large, and gradually the field is prepared for it to gather such public support as to enable it to acquire power without resort to violence.

In the process, Islamist movements might also need to enter into cooperation with other opposition parties, participate in elections, or share power with other parties in a ruling coalition. Care must be taken that all means that are adopted are fully legal. True, Tahan says, this path is a long one and entails great effort, but it is the only way to reach the goal with the least possible loss. He quotes in this regard Syed Abul Ala Maududi of the Jamaat-i-Islami as saying, ‘If the reigns of the army were put in my hands, I would use them to prevent an armed revolution’. Today, says Tahan, most Islamist groups have come to the conclusion that the path to acquiring political power is not through indiscriminate violence or armed insurrection or terror but through peaceful means of education, persuasion and using democratic and legal channels of building public support. Islamic rule cannot be imposed by force. Rather, it must be based on the willing consent of the people, and this can only happen through preaching and by convincing people about the Islamic programme. This path to political power is, however, a demanding one, Tahan recognises. Often, even Islamic groups who abide by legal means and emerge victorious in elections are ruthlessly denied power by ruling regimes backed by the West.

The issue of participating in coalition ministries is one that has caused great debate in Islamist circles, with widely differing opinion being expressed on the matter. In several countries, Islamic parties have shared power in coalition governments with secular parties, from the both the left as well as the right, and have also joined hands with them in the struggle against dictatorial and oppressive regimes. Some Islamic groups have condemned this as ‘un-Islamic’. Tahan, on the other hand, remarks that it would be ‘opposed to the practical spirit of Islam’ for the Islamic movement to remain aloof from other forces and refuse to dialogue with them. ‘Extremism’, he says, ‘will only render the movement hollow from within and lead it far from its goals’. Islamist groups might actually find it in their own interests as well as that of the Muslims at large to enter into coalitions with other forces and groups that do not necessarily share their goals. However, they must always keep in mind the fact that acquisition of power for its own sake is not their objective, and they must not compromise on their principles and ideology, the interests of the people and human rights and freedoms in the process. It is not appropriate for them, says Tahan, to adopt any means that are not democratic and legal in their attempt to acquire power. Before joining a coalition with other forces they must carefully examine the prevailing situation and convince themselves that by doing so they will be better able to serve the cause of Islam and of the Muslim community than by remaining in the opposition.

Tahan refers to the Prophetic example to buttress his case for the possibility of Islamist groups to enter into political agreements with other forces. He says a close examination of the life of the Prophet Muhammad clearly suggests that the early Muslims ‘entered into agreements with others, keeping in mind the prevailing circumstances’. Thus, when in Mecca, the Prophet entered into an agreement with his uncle, Abu Talib, who was not a Muslim, and who granted him protection from the unbelieving Quraish of Mecca. Faced as the early Muslims were with fierce opposition from the Quraish, he instructed some of his disciples to migrate to Christian-ruled Ethiopia, because, he said, the king of that country was just. In Medina, where the Prophet established the first Islamic state, he cemented a pact with the Jews and polytheists of the town, according to which the rights of all parties, Muslims as well as non-Muslims, were clearly spelled out, allowing for them to live in harmony with each other. In order to further strengthen the Islamic state and stave off attacks on it, the Prophet signed no-war pacts with several non-Muslim tribes living in the vicinity of Medina, according to which they and the Muslims were to come to the defence of each other in case of external attack. Likewise, he entered into an agreement with the non-Muslim Quraish of Mecca for several years when he and his followers came to Mecca to perform the umra. In the light of this, says Tahan, Muslims, following the Prophet’s example, can, indeed, enter into pacts with others, provided this is in the interests of Islam and does not go against its basic principles and beliefs. It is in this perspective, Tahan notes, that in several countries Islamic groups have co-operated with other political groups, both on the left as well as the right, because it was not possible for them to achieve their goals on their own.

However, Tahan warns, under no circumstances should Islamic groups ally themselves with forces of oppression and those who ‘wage war’ against Islam, because agreements with others can be entered into only for the sake of Islam and for winning human freedom. ‘Islam and oppression’, Tahan says, can never go together, and so ‘there can never be any unity between the slaves of Allah and the worshippers of oppression’. Agreements with others, in accordance with the Prophetic example, can be undertaken only for two reasons: either for the protection and promotion of Islam or to protect Muslims from calamity. The agreement between the Prophet and Abu Talib was undertaken in order to enable the Prophet to carry on with his preaching unhindered by the opposition of the Quraish. His agreement with the Jews and polytheists of Medina was motivated by a concern for the protection of the rights of the inhabitants of the city. Hence, inspired by the Prophetic example, Islamic groups may enter into agreements with other forces, if, after closely examining the prevailing situation, they come to the conclusion that by doing so they would be able to overcome certain obstacles in the path of their achieving their goals. It is also essential to ensure that by entering into such: an agreement, no hurdles would be placed in the work of preaching Islam, because that is the essential task of the Islamic movement. For these agreements to be successfully implemented, says Tahan, it is essential for Muslims to be united, for the leadership of the Islamic groups to be firm and strong and for their activists to be well disciplined. It is the duty of the leadership to explain to and convince the cadres of the movement about the necessity and the conditions of such agreements lest they begin to doubt their Islamic validity.

Taking note of the fact that regimes in Muslim countries allied to the West have consistently sought to keep Islamic forces away from the citadels of power, Tahan says that their claims to democracy are hollow. When Islamic groups express their willingness to enter the democratic political process by participating in elections, the ruling elites, fearful of power slipping out of their hands, voice the concern that if these groups were voted to power they would, once established, abolish democracy and institute a dictatorship. In this way, Islamic groups who have emerged clearly victorious in elections in several Muslim countries, such as Algeria and Turkey, have been brutally denied the right to assume power by the ruling elites and their Western masters who falsely claim to be ardent defenders of democracy.

Tahan opines that this question is one that merits close examination by Islamic activists. He remarks that some ‘Islamic’ groups have taken an unrealistic stand in assuming that the masses are ‘full Muslims’ and all that is needed is the toppling of the rulers, ‘whom they brand as kafirs, through resort to violence, which they label as a jihad’. They believe that there is simply no possibility or scope for reform within the other existing parties and organisations, all of which they assume to have deviated from Islam. In their passionate, yet misplaced, zeal, they resort to terrorising people. Tahan says that such acts inflict grave damage on common people and only serve to give Islam a bad name.

The question of the transfer of power has not, says Tahan, received the attention it deserves by ideologues of Islamic movements. They see themselves as enforcing God’s law and, therefore, for them to give up power once they have acquired it would, so they believe, be tantamount to working against their very raison d’etre. Tahan recognises that there may seem to be a contradiction here, between the Islamic movements’ insistence on democracy and seeking the views of the people, on the one hand, and the refusal, on the part of some sections of the movements, to give up power once they attain it if the people so demand. A way out of this seeming dilemma, he says, is the position adopted by the Ikhwan-ul Muslimin in Egypt. In a communique issued in March 1994, the Ikhwan declared that, ‘A logical consequence of our accepting the existence of multiple political parties in an Islamic society is that we affirm the possibility of a transfer of power from one to the other, and this is possible only through periodically-held elections’. Tahan also quotes from a fatwa issued by the noted Islamic scholar and activist, Shaikh Yusuf al-Qardawi, who says that if an Islamic party is voted to power but proves unable to keep its promises to the people and fails to act on its party programmes, and, consequently, loses the support of the people, it must respect the people’s opinion, admit its mistakes and transfer power to those who enjoy the support of the public. Thereafter, it must once again try to win the people’s support, albeit through legal means such as preaching, so as to, once again, to come to power.

Women and Politics

The issue of the role of women in politics has generated much debate within Islamist circles, and Tahan devotes an entire chapter to this question. He bitterly critiques those who believe that Muslim women should be restricted to a virtual ‘prison’ from which they should emerge only three times in their entire lifetime: the first time, when they ‘comes out of the womb of their mothers’, the second time, when they ‘enter the house of their husbands’, and the third time, when they are ‘taken to the
burial ground’. In this way, Tahan rues, these ‘narrow-minded’ people seek to shackle women in chains, denying them the opportunity to meet each other, to express their views and to participate in political and community affairs. ‘Such restrictions’, says Tahan, ‘have no place in Islam’.

Tahan refers to the life of the Prophet Muhammad to reinforce his assertion that women, too, should be allowed to play a role in the affairs of society at large. Thus, he says that when the Prophet received his first revelation from God, he was greatly fearful and told his wife, Hazrat Khadijah, about it. She comforted him, saying that God was with him. When the early Muslims, persecuted by the Quraish of Mecca, migrated, first to Ethiopia and then to Medina, there were several women among them, and, says Tahan, they ‘made great sacrifices’. Women, too, gave the oath of allegiance (baiat) to the Prophet. Muslim women at the time of the Prophet even participated in wars, giving water and food to male soldiers, tending to their wounds and taking the bodies of martyred fighters back to Medina.

Muslim women have an important role to play in the conduct of the consultative assembly which advises and guides the ruler of an Islamic state, says Tahan, and their advice must be taken into account. Women performed this function at the time of the Prophet himself, he argues. Women in Islam’s early history also played a part in the election of Caliphs. The Quran clearly says that Muslim men and women are ‘helpers of each other’, ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’. Islam, says Tahan, has provided for an appropriate place for women and has granted her rights. They have the right to education and, if necessity demands, of employment and even the right to participate in political affairs. This is why several Islamist groups have been active among women as well, with some of them setting up their own women’s wings.

Commenting on the differences of opinion among Islamist activists about the political rights of women in an Islamic state, Tahan approvingly refers to a communique issued by the Ikhwan-ul Muslimin of Egypt in 1994, which, he says, ‘has closed all doors for doubt and debate’ on the question. The communique clearly states that Islam in no way forbids women from participating in elections, for the Quran says: ‘Believing men and believing women are helpers unto each other. They enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil’. Women have the right not only to vote for electing members of the consultative committee (majlis-i-shura) or the Parliament but also to become, members of these bodies, and there is nothing in Islam that prevents them from doing so. Further, Tahan adds, ‘If men and women can participate on an equal footing in Parliamentary elections’, they should similarly ‘cooperate with each other within the Islamic movement, so that they can benefit from each other’s views’.

The Ikhwan’s communique goes on to state that barring the post of the head of state, women can be appointed to all public posts. As far as women judges (qazis) are concerned, Tahan notes that there is considerable dispute among the ulema on the matter, but says that the issue is one that requires the exercise of ijtihad or reasoning based on Islamic principles, after taking account the provisions of the shariat and the interests of the community, because there is no clear Quranic commandment on the issue. Given the rights that Islam has provided for women in the political domain, Tahan laments that most Islamic groups have given hardly any representation to women in their consultative assemblies and do not care to take their opinions into account in administrative matters. If women are denied their Islamic rights, Tahan warns, the Islamic movements themselves cannot prosper.

Summing up his discussion of the various challenges facing contemporary Islamist movements, Tahan says that it is not his intention to ‘distort’ Islam or force it into a ‘Western’ mould. He is critical of efforts that have been made to develop what some have called ‘Islamic liberalism’ or ‘Islamic socialism’, for that, in his view, is a caricature of Islam made to suit a different political agenda. He notes that in the contemporary world there are only two systems that are in force—democracy and dictatorship. Democracy upholds human freedom and rights, while dictatorship seeks to strangulate them. In this
context, Tahan says, the Islamic movement has to make its position clear. He suggests that Islam shares much in common with democracy as he defines it. Democracy and Islam, he says, agree on the following: protection of human rights, full freedom, plebiscite, parliamentary elections, opposition parties, protection of minorities, transfer of power and women’s political rights.

Democracy, Tahan says, is a human invention, but it is ‘ a great success for the human mind’. Shura and Democracy share much in common. He refers here to a fatwa delivered by Shaikh Yusuf al-Qardawi in response to a question asking whether democracy is incompatible with Islam and is a form of disbelief (kufr) or falsehood (munkar). Qardawi’s reply was that it was ‘unfortunate’ that ‘these issues were being mixed up’, as a result of which for many it ‘becomes difficult to distinguish between truth (haq) and falsehood (batil)’, which opens the door for the hurling of fatwas of disbelief at others. He lamented that ‘It is simply amazing that some people outrightly condemn democracy as kufr and batil, whereas they have no knowledge at all about the truth of democracy’.

Tahan agrees entirely with Qardawi here, and says that Islamic groups must have nothing whatsoever to do with terrorism, for that is not only a violation of democracy but is also against the against teachings and spirit of Islam. Protecting innocent lives is a fundamental tenet of Islam. Critiquing groups who have resorted to terror in the name of jihad, he says that such policies reflect a fundamental immaturity and a poor understanding of the prevailing conditions on the part of their leadership, which ultimately results in a calamity for the society at large, for the Muslim ummah as a whole and for the Islamic movements themselves. Tahan expresses the hope that Islamic activists would adopt a balanced policy, focus on creating awareness of what he regards as the true teachings of Islam, advocate justice and righteousness, crusade against evils and play a constructive role in the society, instead.

Tahan believes that extremism has today emerged as a global problem, and he locates its principal cause in the fact that its advocates believe that they possess a monopoly over the truth and that, therefore, there is no room for differences of opinion. They accuse all others of being kafirs and of straying away from Islam. Its most extreme manifestation is when usurping the life and the wealth of others is declared to be legal for them. Of the various forms of extremism, says Tahan, the most dangerous is religious extremism. In order to gain legitimacy for their stance, religious extremists seek fatwas from ‘corrupt’ ulema declaring others to be disbelievers, and then set about killing them. It will clearly not do, Tahan remarks, to dismiss extremism as simply a result of a conspiracy by external forces to which the extremists have fallen prey. There are other, internal causes as well, including wrong beliefs and interpretations of religion, poor training, weak and incompetent leadership, and a lack of clearly-stated goals.

In addition, says, Tahan, it is undeniable that the policies of Western regimes have much to do with the emergence of extremism in Muslim lands. The West, mortally afraid of Islamic revivalism and the challenge that it poses to its global hegemony, has consistently sought to suppress Islamic movements in the Muslim world. Yet, Tahan, says, there is scope for constructive dialogue with the West. It is true that historically the relations between the Islamic world and Western Christendom have generally been hostile. Furthermore, Islam has fundamental differences with secularism and nationalism—the basic tenets of contemporary Western political thought.

However, Tahan writes, Muslims must ‘accept every worthy thing, whatever its origins’. ‘Wisdom is the lost property of the believer, wherever he may find it’, Tahan says, suggesting that Muslims must not be not averse accepting anything worth adopting from other cultures and peoples, including the West. Nor does Islam forbid them from doing so.

Tahan’s major complaint against the West is that it sees the ‘Third World’ as its ‘personal property’. These countries are ‘viewed simply as sources of raw material and markets for its finished goods’. The West ‘loudly trumpets its claims to being the champion of democracy and human rights, but itself denies these rights to the people of the Third World’. The day the West gives up its supercilious attitude towards the rest and stops ‘treating others as its slaves’, Tahan says, ‘it shall face no problem at all from the Muslims or any other community in living together with them in harmony’.

In the context of West Asia, Tahan opines, the combined Western and Israeli campaign against Islamic groups, which is projected as a crusade against ‘Islamic terrorism’, is a cruel farce, for the principal cause of the on-going turbulence in the region is the Western backing for the usurper state of Israel and support for its imperialistic designs on Muslim lands, as well as its sponsoring of pliant, undemocratic regimes in Muslim countries in order to protect the West’s own economic and strategic interests. The message is clear: violence can only be stopped when the West reverses its stand and gives the Muslims their due. Furthermore, the attempt to equate Islamic awakening, the struggle against oppression, and the Islamic movement in general, with ‘terrorism’ must be ‘stiffly opposed’, Tahan says, for, he asserts, it is but a crude means for the West and its allies in the Muslim world to continue their oppressive control and stave off any challenge to their hegemony.

The West’s selective definition of what constitutes ‘terrorism’ must be clearly exposed, Tahan pleads. Any challenge to Western or Israeli interests or attempts to protest against their oppression by Muslims is branded as ‘terrorism’, he notes, while Western and Israeli acts of violence and brazen aggression are termed as ‘legitimate self-defence’ against ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and as ‘measures to protect peace’. ‘A new of definition of terrorism is needed today’, Tahan says, one that clearly champions the cause of the oppressed, whoever they may be.

Parallel to the external challenge from the West are the threats to Muslims from within—sectarianism, territorialism, racism and nationalism, Tahan rues. Even within each Muslim country, serious divisions have emerged between different Muslim groups. Tahan advocates a ‘realistic approach’ to tackle these grave dangers. Each community within the broad umbrella of the Muslim ummah has its own characteristics and its own particular cultural traits, he says, which must be accepted and respected. These should in no way become the cause of conflict or enmity. All Muslims are one, Tahan declares. All humans are children of Adam and Eve, and as the Quran says, an Arab is not superior to a non-Arab or a white to a black. The only criterion for judging a persons’ worth in Islam is his or her piety, not his race or wealth or country. It is natural for one to love one’s land of birth, but, he stresses, when patriotism takes the form of ‘nation-worship’ it transgresses the bounds of Islam, for in Islam worship is due only to God. Likewise, Tahan says, it is natural, too, to identify with one’s own ethnic group’, but, as a Tradition of the Prophet puts it, when this love assumes the form of ‘supporting one’s community in oppression’, it goes against the teachings of Islam.

Ethnic and Religious Minorities

Islam lays down clear rules about the treatment of religious minorities, says Tahan. They should be given ‘full freedom’, ‘duly respected’, guaranteed ‘all natural and human rights’, ‘protected from any discrimination’, be considered ‘equal before the law’ and must be given ‘equal opportunities for progress’. Their rights and responsibilities vis-a-vis the state are not different from that of the Muslim citizens. As for ethnic minorities, they, too enjoy the same rights as others. To discriminate against them is ‘anti-Islamic’. In an Islamic state, all citizens, says Tahan, ‘are bound by the principle of live and let live’. They must work together for the welfare of the society at large, exploring areas of common concern.

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Analysing the manifold challenges that Islamic movements are faced with on several fronts, Tahan comes up with a model for an ‘Islamic state’, which he sees as true to the teachings of Islam as well as fully appropriate to meet the demands of modernity. His scathing attack on the double standards of the West, which poses itself as a champion of human rights and democracy but yet is responsible for gross human rights violations all over the globe, and his unsparing criticism of ruling regimes in the Muslim world allied to the West, bring in new dimension to the debate on human rights in the ‘Third World’. His critique extends to many Islamic movements themselves, despite him being a noted Islamist ideologue.

Highlighting the pitfalls of mindless violence, denial of the rights of women and minorities and so on, Tahan puts forward what he sees as the correct Islamic position on many contentious matters. One need not agree with everything that he says, but it is undeniable that the perspectives he articulates on matters that are today vigorously debated can prove crucial in redefining the policies and perspectives of Islamist movements, which are destined to play an increasingly important role in the future.

“My Question to all are the Islamic Fundamantlist ready giveup the caused and live like a common people in civlized world………………Are they allowed the preachers to shun voilance adopt peace and prosperty without mingled religion with cause.”Courtsy: South Asian

Kashmiri Pandits Demand A Homeland

In kashmir on November 3, 2008 at 16:34

Kashmiri Pandits Demand A Homeland

Vijay K. Sazawal, Ph.D.

The year is 1492. King Ferdinand of Spain has given the Jews of Spain a choice – either convert to Christianity or leave the country. Some 200,000 Jews flee for their lives. Half a world away, in Kashmir, the Kashmiri Pandits (KPs) are faring no better. Update of the essay originally written in 1993.

The year is 1492. King Ferdinand of Spain has given the Jews of Spain a choice – either convert to christianity or leave the country. Some 200,000 Jews flee for their lives. Half a world away, in Kashmir, the Kashmiri Pandits (KPs) are faring no better. It is 22 years since Budshah Zain-ul-Abdin has died and the throne of Kashmir is passing back and forth between Fateh Shah, Badshah’s grandson and the 12th Sultan of Kashmir, and Muhammed Shah Hamadani, whose family came from Persia and settled in Kashmir about 120 years earlier. Sultan Fateh Shah, like his ancestor Sikandar (6th Sultan), has unleashed tyranny on KP’s, imposed “jiziya tax”, destroyed temples and religious books, and forcibly converted 24,000 KP families to Islam. Some KP families who had returned to Kashmir during Budshah’s reign are forced to flee the valley again.

Time marches on. Five centuries later, King Juan Carlos of Spain “apologizes” to Jews and holds a reconciliation meeting with the Israeli President Chaim Herzog in a synagogue on March 31, 1992. However, for KPs the history has come full circle, and the painful memories of Sikandar and Fateh Shah are brought alive by the rape, torture and death of KPs, resulting in an unprecedented mass exodus of the community from the valley since 1990. On the very day the Jews and Catholics are celebrating their reconciliation in Madrid, in the Nai Sark locality of Srinagar one of the very few KP holdouts in the valley named Shri Mohan Lal Braroo, his wife and daughter are killed by two Muslim militants who rape the two women prior to their murder. Instead of receiving an apology, the community continues to be decimated by the alien forces that have controlled their destiny since 1320 A.D.

Indians, in general, have heen cool to the idea of a secure homeland for KPs, because on the surface it appears to be a solution of convenience, and hence “not right.” To comprehend this idea fully, one has to learn about the slow extinction of KPs and their culture, the realities of the world political situation today, and the geopolitics of the subcontinent. The homeland for KPs may be the only viable way now to secure a cultural outpost for a community that traces a proud (and well documented) history of 5,000 years as the cradle of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, but today is on throes of extinction.

Journey into Oblivion

Kashmir’s coversion to Islam began with Shah Mir’s regime in 1339. This paradigm, that has been entrenched for 650 years, is unlikely to change drastically even under pressure from the mightiest military and political forces in the subcontinent. Consequently, the KPs have been reduced to a minority in their own land, and today even with “four Indian soldiers for every KP” in the valley, KPs have been tortured, raped, and killed in the valley by the Muslim militants and most KPs have fled in fear, leaving their lands, homes and religious ties behind.

The real tragedy is that it is history repeating itself over and over again. As far back as 1400, there were only eleven KP families left in the valley as a result of Muslim atrocities and forced migration to the rest of India. Apart from a few families returning now and then, particularily during Budshah’s time (1420-1470), the migration of the KPs from the valley has been basically a one way journey into oblivion. Over the last 650 years, the repeated exodus has decimated the ethnic identity of the community, its population and culture. Once having left the valley, KPs have shown little inclination to return mainly because of what they see as insecure life with dwindling economic and political upportunities in a hostile Islamic fundamentalist environment. While it is easy to dismiss such a belief as an over-reaction, the truth is not far behind as borne by repeated waves of forced migration from the valley since the beginning of Islamic rule.

The concept of the KP homeland is the first viable alternative to interrupt this paradigm and hence the most revolutionary KP idea in the last 650 years. The homeland will put KPs on par with other ethnic communities in the subcontinent, who have maintained a historical right and access to their land of origins.

Geopolitical Realities

The two neighboring countries outside of India and Pakistan that can influence events in Kashmir are Afganistan and Kazakhstan. Here the unfolding events are a bearer of bad news for the subcontinent, and it is getting worse by the day. Afghanistan has emerged after 14 years of civil war very much like Lebanon. The departure of the Pathan leader Najibullah and his communist structure (Watan Party) has given way to a three way tussle between Uzbeks (led by Turkic-speaking Abdul Dostam), Tajiks (led by Persian-speaking Ahmed Shah Masood) and Pathans (led by Pashtu-speaking Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). At this time, the world spotlight is on Masood and his Jamiat-e-Islami party, but even if he were to emerge as the victor in the United Nations (UN) sponsored political negotiations currently underway, it is unlikely that various ethnic groups in Afghanistan – Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pathans, Baluchis, Turks, and Hazaras – will work towards unification. The underlying strategy of Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e-Islami movement is that only Islamic fundamentalism can provide the “political glue” that can bind the nation together. Hence Afghanistan is bound to emerge as a militant Islamic state in the future, if not in the next few months.

Kazakhstan is an Algeria in the making. The President, Nursultan Nazabaev, basically oversees the defunct Communist apparatus, and is personally committed to a secular state. However, the political dissent arising from the economic subservience experienced by Kazakhs at the hands of the ruling class in Kazakhstan, who are people of Russian and German descent. The political aspirations of Kazakhs, already reduced to a minority, are represented by the nationalist movement called Alash which is advocating revival of the Islamic way of life. Nazabaev has quelled Alash and jailed its top leaders, but if western style casinos open in Alma Ata (the capial of Kazakhstan), as planned, the movement is bound to grow in strength. Kazakhistan represents a plum for the Islamic fundamentalist movement, since it is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons production facilities and ballistic missile launch sites. The latest published figures show that there are 104 ICBMs (with 1040 nuclear warheads) and 40 strategic bombers (with 360 nuclear warheads) based in Kazakhstan.

The sum total of the geopolitical realities today is that Islamic fundamentalism(Sunni muslims) has or will spread to countries that surround Kashmir. It is expected to sweep the valley, which is full of welcome believers, in spite of the efforts by the Indian government to turn the tide and change the course of history. Thus, the prudent thing would be to not only try to contain the Islamic militancy but also to plan for alternative strategies, if the valley is finally overrun by competing political and religious forces Superpower Play

From the halls of the European Parliament in Strasbourg to the back rooms of the United Nations in New York, big powers are urging India and Pakistan to resolve the problem of Kashmir. There is ample evidence pointing to a developing consensus to bring Kashmir back into the world focus which will eventually lead to increasing the number of external (UN or otherwise) observers in the valley. Such a move is bound to give psychological boost to anti-Indian elements, thereby propelling them to champion their agenda with renewed vigor. This chain reaction will lead to increased militancy, subversion, terrorism, abuse of human rights, Islamic fundamentalism, and possibly a nuclear war.

In order to prevent this catastrophe, great emphasis should be placed on the recent writings in the Washington Post and the New York Times on Kashmir reflecting the future direction of the U.S. foreign policy. The solution – which will surely please neither India nor Pakistan – is to split the state, integrating most of Jammu and Ladakh with the Indian Union, and creating a new Indian state consisting of the Kashmir valley along with bordering Muslim pockets in Jammu and Ladakh regions. The line of actual control (LAC) will become the international border, allowing both India and Pakistan to retain sovereignty over the existing portions of Kashmir under their authority. However, both countries would demilitarize the region under the UN supervision and create a porous border to allow Kashmiris free travel between the two areas. The two Kashmirs will be given equal autonomy by both the countries which will be established during negotiation.

The above scenerio may appear far-fetched today but it can happen in the new world order where the United States has emerged as a sole superpower and the UN has taken the role of enforcer. The concerns that must be addressed are: What if it happens? What recourse do KPs have? Where will they end up? Should such a proud community with a 5,000 year old past end up as dinosaurs in the new world order?

Even if India were to eventually succeed in standing up to the world opinion, Kashmiri militants, and Islamic fundamentalism, the KP homeland would still have served its purpose. Recognizing that KPs cannot return to their homes immediately, the homeland will provide a safe haven and a secure zone for KPs to maintain a critical mass and allow continuity in their way of life.

KP Homeland

The homeland for KPs is an idea whose time has come and this concept should be given serious consideration by the Indian government and its people.

The idea of the separate homeland is endorsed by most KPs. As Indian citizens, KPs are exercisizing their right to demand safety and security within the Indian Union that has been denied to them for the last 650 years. Recently, the Indian government resumed political dialogue with Kashmiri Muslims (with the release of five Kashmiri political leaders from detention) to understand their aspirations. Time has also come to understand the position of other rightful inhabitants of the Kashmir valley.

KPs have expressed their aspirations for the homeland in a number of meetings held both in India and abroad. For example, on July 14 and 15, 1990 at a two-day international conference held in Jammu, the top intellectual and political leaders of the community made an unanimous demand (named Resolution No 4), the lead paragraph of which states:

“The scattered Kashmiri Hindu minority should be re-organised in a manner that will create a securiy zone with concentrated Hindu population in the valley, so as to accommodate seven lakh Kashmiri Hindus including those who have migrated from Kashmir in the past due to political and economic compulsions and having been deprived of their due share in the affairs of the state especially Kashmir Province.”

On November 14, 1991, at a meeting held by the representatives of the Kashmir Overseas Association, Indo-American Kashmir Forum and Panun Kashmir, a brief was released to the Press which includes the following statement:

“We strongly recommend and ask for the creation of safe areas, security zones on the same pattern as has been done by the United States of America for the Kurds in Iraq. In the security zones the Government shall have to give the displaced Kashmiris their fundamental right to security, honorable living, amd economic and ethnic viability. This may neccessitate constitutional guarantees for the displaced population. we reaffirm our support to the deliberations carried out at the Kashmiri Hindu Convention at Jammu in July 1990.”

In a second convention held in Jammu on December 26, 1991 called Margdarshan-91 that was attended by over 1,000 delegates from India and abroad, the KPs announced the following demands:
The establisment of a separate homeland for Kashmiri Hindus in the Kashmir Valley, comprising the regions of the valley to the East and North of river Jhelum.
The consitution of India be made applicable in letter and spirit in this homeland in order to ensure the right to life, liberty, freedom of expression, faith, equality and rule of law.
The homeland should be placed under central administration with a Union Territory Status until the time that it evolves its own economic and political infrastructure.
All the seven lakh Kashmiri Hindus, including those who have been driven out of Kashmir in the past and yearn to return to their homeland, and those who were forced to leave on account of the terrorist violence in Kashmir, be settled in the homeland on equitable basis with dignity and honor.
PANUN KASHMIR: A Homeland for Kashmiri Pandits.

The KP homeland will consist of areas north of the Pir Panchal mountains, starting from the Jawahar Tunnel and comprising of portions of the following districts: Anantnag, Baramulla, Srinagar, and Pulwama. The area will be carved out in a manner so that the Indian security forces can maintain control of strategic locations in the event that the Kashmir Valley is demilitarized under an international plan. Equally significant, however, is that historically important Hindu holy shrines and cultural centers in Anantnag, Verinag, Bawan, Mattan, and Amarnath will be saved from destruction and come alive with the chants and fervor of the believers – a key ingredient in alleviating the psychological pain and suffering experienced by the KP refugees today. Once their hearts, home, and hearth are in the proper place, KPs will surmount any problems related to the economic development of the region with confidence as survivors of the holocaust.

Conclusion

The demand for the KP homeland is not only just but also of strategic significance to India as the new world order imposes the final settlement on Kashmir. The KP community has lost its identity and is well on its way to extinction, unless their fate takes a new turn. The idea of the homeland is a monumental step in reversing the historical trends that have continued unabated in the last 650 years. The demand for the homeland is based on the current geopolitical realities both inside and outside of Kashmir and is the only way to save the Hindu people and culture in the valley. It is a basic right of a community to survive as a cultural and cthnic entity, and therefore the demand for a KP homeland should be affirmed by the government that is sworn to protect the life and liberty of its citizens. We can wait no longer.

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