China: Latest assessment of Kashmir issue

China: Latest assessment of Kashmir issue Guest Column-by D. S. Rajan The assessment on Kashmir issue, given by Chen Yiwu, the Pakistan based correspondent of the People’s Daily (Online Chinese language edition, Dec 1 &2,2004) for the benefit of readers in China, is notable for its significance, as views expressed in the authoritative paper invariably reflect the Chinese official stand. Taking note of the resumption of India-Pakistan peace talks since November 29,2004 and giving a historic account of the circumstances surrounding the Kashmir issue, the article described the issue as a ‘time bomb’ in India-Pakistan relations. Hinting that Pakistan’s stiff anti-India position on Kashmir is linked to its inability to take over Hyderabad and Junagarh at the time of partition, the article highlighted the fact that both India and Pakistan accepted the January 20,1948 UN Security Council resolution for a ceasefire, demilitarization and a step by step solution on the accession issue by holding a ‘plebiscite’. It added that in the fifties, India considered Pakistan as an aggressor in Kashmir and demanded for full withdrawal of latter’s troops before a ‘plebiscite’ could be held. Pakistan, on its part, asked for withdrawal of troops of both the sides from Kashmir prior to such a plebiscite. Observing that Pakistan’s joining the SEATO in 1954 and later the Baghdad Pact were aimed at resisting India’s strength, the write-up indirectly criticized India for announcing the irrelevance of the plebiscite principle on the pretext of Pakistan’s joining such military blocs. It pointed out that in the 15 years since the beginning of armed attacks in the Indian controlled Kashmir in 1989, 45000 people were killed. Though the accession of Kashmir is basically a legacy of India-Pakistan partition, the subsequent changes in the international situation and the continued uncertainty in India-Pakistan relations, brought other factors like security and political strategy of each side into focus, making the issue further complicated, the People’s Daily item remarked. Analysing the perceptions of India and Pakistan regarding the issue, the item said that although the Indian Congress Party came under compulsion to accept partition in 1947, India till today does not accept the ‘ two nation theory’, which formed the basis for Mountbatten’s formula on partition of the South Asian sub-continent. India is of the view that the partition has caused damage to its historic unity which arose out of the country’s old culture. The partition also had a deep negative influence on India’s big power status as well as defence. Pakistan, on its part, relies on the ‘two nation theory’ to win a broad Muslim religious and national sympathy. Moreover, since its formation, it is intentionally making efforts to gain features, which are different from that of India, so that it can exist as a pure Muslim nation. The article further observed that when Pakistan came into being, India thought that the former would not survive for long and aspired to continuously weaken that country with an eye on its leading position in the sub-continent. Also, India hoped for reunification of the sub-continent some day, considering partition as a mistake. Facing serious imbalance in terms of national strength and keeping in view India’s long term plans, the Government and people of Pakistan were pushed to nurture a feeling of crisis and insecurity. Pakistan saw India’s taking over of Hyderabad and Junagarh by force. It also realized that at the same time, India was not willing to abandon its claim over the Muslim majority Kashmir but with a Hindu ruler. The People’s Daily item opined that these factors led to Pakistan’s resolve to support the cause of Kashmir’s accession to it through use of force. Tracing the strategic reasons behind deepening of India-Pakistan hostility and unyielding positions on Kashmir issue adopted by both the sides, the article said that. Pakistan views the Kashmir issue as being not purely a territorial one, but also religious in nature, in view of the region’s Muslim majority. For India, protecting Kashmir is important for establishing an effective control over other regions in the country, particularly over Punjab through curbing separatist tendencies there. India also feels that if Kashmir goes out of its control, it could face a chain reaction. Kashmir is the home for the family of former Prime Minister Nehru and is thus a pride for the nation and the people. The People’s Daily item added that in addition India feels that the rich Indus river and its tributaries flowing into Pakistan, originate in Kashmir and that a control over this would ensure its domination over the life-line of Pakistan’s water resources. Pointing out to the emergence of internal pressures in each side on the Kashmir issue over the years, the item assessed that as a result, a realistic concession or compromise on the issue appear difficult for both India and Pakistan. As the country’s constitution stipulates that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India, New Delhi, irrespective of the party in power, cannot accept any formula for solving the Kashmir issue on the basis of a plebiscite. If it does so, the regime would come under the blame of selling the country’s territory. For Pakistan, helping the Kashmir Muslims on the accession issue is a policy evolved out of an internal consensus. The article remarked that any rethinking in this regard by Pakistan would make the country to face political dangers, particularly in respect of internal stability. Making a reference to measures taken by India and Pakistan like holding of elections to legitimize the regimes in their respective sides of Kashmir, the article said that in such a process, local forces and elements with vested interests have emerged in both sides of Kashmir, capable of putting pressure on India and Pakistan in the matter of making mutual concessions. Though the article is generally balanced, what is visible is a veiled criticism of India for its attempts to weaken Pakistan with an eye on gaining a leading position in the sub-continent as well as its stand on the plebiscite principle. The strategic perceptions of India and Pakistan on Kashmir and the assessment that both the sides may not be in a position to yield or compromise in the face of pressures likely from the vested interests in two Kashmirs, as brought out in the People’s Daily item, give an indication as to how the Chinese view the situation. Interestingly, the People’s Daily item made no mention of other factors relevant to India-Pakistan relations like the nuclear issue, the question of infiltration from across the border and Kargil conflict. This is also the case regarding Kashmir territory ceded by Pakistan to China

INDIA: Mulling Tough Options Against Pakistan

INDIA: Mulling Tough Options Against Pakistan
Written by Praful Bidwai
NEW DELHI, Dec 3 (IPS) – United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrives in the Indian capital Wednesday to try and soothe nerves frayed by last week’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai, but is likely to face an uphill task in defusing mounting suspicion and tension between India and Pakistan.

Many Indian policymakers have adopted a hardened posture against Pakistan in the belief that its state agencies, such as the shadowy Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI), were behind the attacks, which have killed nearly 200 people, including 28 foreign nationals.

Conservative commentators have unleashed what is fast becoming a media campaign to demand that India takes serious punitive action against Pakistan for the attacks –to the point of striking at terrorist training camps which Indian spy agencies claim exist across the border.

Liberals, who prefer a diplomatic rather than military approach to the issue, and defend freedom and civil liberties, are sharply critical of the conservative hawks. But it is not clear that they can persuade the Indian government to take a reasoned and sober approach.

‘’Nobody is talking of military action against Pakistan… what will be done, time will show,” India’s foreign minister Pranab Mukerjee said Tuesday, while speaking at the Indo-Arab Forum.

”If the already fragile India-Pakistan process breaks down, diplomatic and trade relations are frozen, and a conflict breaks out, the consequences will be grim,” says Kamal Mitra Chenoy, a professor in the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. ”Any conflict that breaks out today between India and Pakistan has the potential, the deadly potential, to escalate to the nuclear level and cause unspeakable destruction.”

Under pressure to take a tough stand against Pakistan, New Delhi has summoned Pakistan’s ambassador and issued a formal protest. He was told the attacks were carried out by ”elements from Pakistan” and ”the government expects that strong action would be taken against those elementsà”

According to the official spokesperson of India’s ministry of external affairs, the diplomat was told that ”Pakistan’s actions needed to match the sentiments expressed by its leadership, that it wishes to have a qualitatively new relationships with India”.

India has bluntly told Pakistan that it must hand over to it 20 ”most wanted fugitives”, including notorious gangster Dawood Ibrahim, and an extremist leader (Masood Azhar) who was exchanged for hostages during the hijacking of an Indian aircraft in 1999.

Many of the hawks who advocate a hardline approach are livid at the attacks, which they see as an insult to, or a slighting of, India. They describe it as India’s own ”September 11”.

They are particularly incensed that gunmen carrying sophisticated arms and explosives could land their boats in Mumbai unhindered and proceed to strike at nine or more sites, including a crowded railway station and two luxury hotels.

Like protestors in Mumbai, who blame India’s political leaders for their incompetence and indifference to security issues, the hardliners too want the armed forces and security agencies to have a prominent role in deciding how to respond to acts of terrorism.

Some of them focus on the alleged involvement of the Pakistani jehadi extremist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and by implication, Pakistani state agencies, in the attacks.

India’s police agencies, which are investigating the attacks and following the leads emerging from the interrogation of arrested terrorist Mohammed Ajmal Amir Iman (alias Qasab) in Mumbai, claim to have discovered a conspiracy at the centre of which is LeT.

But Pakistani leaders say India has not offered them any specific evidence of LeT’s involvement. What is needed is solid, hard, incontrovertible evidence, which can withstand critical scrutiny, and on the basis of which the attackers and their co-conspirators can be convicted.

The leads pointing to LeT’s involvement must be fully established if the international community is to be convinced and Pakistan’s cooperation is to be secured.

For the first time, though, the Indian authorities have caught an attacker red-handed, who can provide invaluable information, evidence and clues for further investigation.

LeT was created and trained by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency. LeT is banned in many countries, including the U.S. The armed wing of the extremist Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad, LeT is alleged to have conducted numerous operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since 1993.

It was blamed by New Delhi for a terrorist attack on India’s Parliament house in December 2001, which led to a 10 month-long eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between the two countries, with a million troops amassed at the border.

”Many of the hawks’ premises are mistaken,” argues political scientist Zoya Hasan. ”For instance, it is simply wrong to use the 9/11 analogy for the Mumbai attacks. The two are different in context, scale and impact.”

Adds Hasan: ”The Twin Towers casualties were 16 times higher than in Mumbai. They exposed the vulnerability of the American homeland –for the first time in 60 years. Indians have long recognised their vulnerability, having suffered scores of attacks in the last two decades. 9/11 changed the way the U.S. looks at the world, including Islam. Mumbai probably won’t alter India’s outlook.”

Similarly, the assumption that LeT’s involvement necessarily implicates the ISI or the Pakistan Army, or proves the complicity of the civilian government headed by President Asif Ali Zardari, is questioned by many former intelligence officials in India.

One of them told IPS on condition of anonymity that ”it would be wrong to assume that LeT enjoys no autonomy and the ISI still fully controls it. Making a direct equation between LeT, the ISI, the Pakistan Army and the elected civilian government, and accusing them of having colluded to engineer the attacks, would be way off the mark”.

This official’s assessment is that Zardari’s government would not want to undermine the peace process with India and risk a costly conflict at a time when Pakistan is in dire economic trouble and volatile thanks to a growing collapse of governance and rising ethnic strife. These are manifested in the current Mohajir-Pushtun clashes in Karachi, and the creeping Taliban takeover of the North-Western Frontier Province.

That conspiracy theory sits ill with Zardari’s recent statement pledging not to use nuclear weapons first against India.

Zardari has often said that Pakistan can ill-afford to unleash against India the forces of extremism which have caused havoc on its own territory.

After all, Pakistan is also a victim of extremists, who claimed his wife Benazir Bhutto’s life, carried out the Sep. 20 attack on the Marriott hotel in Islamabad, and earlier made two major attempts on former president Pervez Musharraf’s life.

On Tuesday, Zardari told the ”Financial Times” that provocation by extremist ”non-state actors” poses the danger of a return to war between India and Pakistan, and rhetorically asked: ”Even if the militants are linked to LeT, who do you think we are fighting?”

”Many will question his claim that Pakistan is seriously fighting LeT or its parent organisation, Harkat-ul-Dawa,” says Achin Vanaik, professor of international relations and global politics and Delhi University. ”Pakistan imposed a formal ban on the group, but it reappeared under a different name. Its leader, Hafiz Mohammed Said, is a free man. And HuD holds public meetings, according to many credible reports.”

Nevertheless, adds Vanaik, ”India should take Pakistan’s offer to help investigate the attacks. Although it has reneged on its earlier offer to send the ISI director-general to India, it still promises to send a senior agency official. India should respond positively to this and try to build alliances with the saner elements in Pakistan who recognise the dangers of fomenting jehadi terrorism.”

The alternative would be to drift towards conflict, insecurity and war. If India insists on its demand about turning in fugitives living in Pakistan, there is a danger that Pakistan will not comply. India cannot compel it.

Says Vanaik: ”This seriously risks an armed conflict, which neither side can win, but is fraught with grave nuclear danger. The only gainers from an India-Pakistan conflict will be extremists and terrorists — besides the U.S. through a heightened mediatory role. This would only confirm the view that the attacks are a gift from the most criminalised orders of the global Right to its most powerful echelons.”

However, there is an honourable and peaceful way out. This is to take the Mumbai case to the United Nations Security Council under Resolution 1373, which requires all states to ”refrain from providing any form of supportà to entities or persons involved in terrorist actsà”, give ”early warning to other states” and ”deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts…” all on pain of punitive measures.

This multilateral approach, analysts say, would obviate overbearing US influence and must be explored. But it is not clear that Indian leaders would muster the will to do so.

Jammu and Kashmir Assembly Elections Results 2008

Jammu and Kashmir Assembly Elections Results 2008

Schedule for holding General Election to
the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir

General Election Results to Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir will be announced on Dec 28, 2008 (Sunday)

Poll Event                          Poll Event                                                                            Date
1                                 Counting of Votes on                                                    Monday Dec 08, 2008
2                                 Date before which the Election shall be Completed       Saturday Dec 13, 2008

General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu & Kashmir

The Assembly Elections of Jammu & Kashmir has been declared by Election Commission. There will be a 7 phase election, the dates of which has been fixed for 14th , 23rd , 30th November, 2008, and 7th , 13th , 17th , 24th December, 2008, The Legislative Assembly of the State of Jammu & Kashmir was dissolved on 10 th July, 2008 and since then the state has been placed under the Governor’s rule. This will come to an end on 10 th January, 2008.

As per constitutional law (Section 138 read with Section 52 (1) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Reference No.1 of 2002 [AIR 2003 SC 87, (2002) 8 SCC 237], and Section 27 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957) , it is mandatory on the part of the Election Commission to hold general election to constitute the new Legislative Assembly in the State before 10th January, 2009.

ASSEMBLY CONSTITUENCY
Under Section 47 read with Section 48 of the Constitution of J & K, the assembly constituency is as follows:
State Total No.                          ACs        ACs reserved for SC                           ACs reserved for ST
Jammu & Kashmir                     87                         7                                                          -

ELECTORAL ROLLS

There are 65,38,111 electors in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

ELECTORS PHOTO IDENTITY CARDS (EPIC)

The identification of the voters at the polling booth at the time of poll is mandatory.Presently, the EPIC coverage in J & K is 68.00%.

POLLING STATIONS

There are 8,109 polling stations in the State.

DATE OF ELECTION

There will be seven phase elections in the state, starting from 14th November, 2008 till 24th December 2008.

India Reels Under Terorism

October 20, 2008 by kilo3

For decades, India has blamed Pakistan for supporting terrorist activities inside India and funding and training Islamic militant groups in India’s part of Kashmir. In recent times, New Delhi has pointed to Bangladesh, too, where it claims militants responsible for some terrorist attacks find shelter. India-Pakistan friction over Kashmir also trickles down to India’s Muslims.

 

India is one of the major partners in America’s fight against terrorism. Recent reports have shown that India is facing a wave of terrorists attacks that threaten the stability of the nation.

Current tenstions between India and Pakistan have lead to a significant amounts of deaths caused by terrorism since 2007. U.S. government assures that,

 

“According to the latest report on global terrorism by the U.S. government’s National Counterterrorism Center, more than one thousand people died in India because of terrorist attacks in 2007, ranking the country fourth behind only Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Most of these deaths relate to the territorial dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. But internal causes contribute significantly to this violence, including conflict with India’s Maoists-the Naxalites-and other separatist and insurgent movements in the country’s northeastern states.” (Council on Foreign Relations)

 

The disputed territory of Kashmir has been the significant driving force between Hindus and Muslims for centuries. Now that the United States is helping fund both Pakistan and India, Pakistan with military aid and India with nuclear technology, it begs to question when this will blow up in the U.S. face and turn to a drastic regional conflict in which both sides possess nuclear weapons. India has been a significant ally in the war on terror compared to Pakistan, which its intelligence services and the Pakistani army are sympathetic to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Recent reports have surfaced regarding Pakistani troops firing on the U.S. Military when they are engaging Taliban fighters. Letting them get away from the Americans and being able to take shelter in mountainous region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

 

The U.S. has found itself in a dangerous position but in its fight against terrorism, it would be better to have both of these nations as “allies” than not at all. I perceive that the war on terror will continue depending on who becomes the next president. But if we were to keep our guard down, then we are in big trouble. Terrorism is not an ideology, it’s a tactic and it seems that the U.S. has been engaging the same enemy for a while that constant innovation is needed to defeat the enemy.

 

 

 

 

 

Remembering The war (The 1962 India-China war)

 

The Rediff Special/Col (retd) Anil Athale  World history is full of ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ when it is commonly assumed that if only a certain action had been taken, history would have been different.

In India it is almost an industry since we have surfeit of disasters that litter our 5,000-year history. The 1962 military disaster is no exception and has spawned works like the ‘Guilty Men of 1962′ or self-justificatory works like the ‘Untold Story’ by General B M Kaul, et al.

The first missed opportunity to avoid the conflict came in December 1960 when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made a brief stopover in Delhi. Under the so-called ‘Krishna Menon Plan’ it was mooted that India would lease the Aksai Chin area to China and in return the Chinese would lease the strategic (from the Indian point of view) Chumbi valley that is like a dagger pointed at the line of communication with Assam and the Northeast.

This would have been a very fair deal as the Aksai Chin area, besides being strategically useless to India, was also very difficult to defend.

But it is believed that under the pressure from the right wing of the Congress and fear of vociferous opposition, Nehru rejected it. A hint of this is available in Michael Breacher’s ‘India & World Politics: Krishna Menon’s view of the world’ (Oxford University Press, 1966, p 145-154) as well as an account of that visit in Swadhinta (January 26, 1966) by Pandit Sunderlal.

China at that time was no superpower and wary of American designs on it through Taiwan (then called Nationalist China, which occupied the Chinese seat in the UN Security Council). Indian friendship was of great value to China then.

But an obdurate Nehru missed the chance. In subsequent years this proposal was revived, but by now a confident China saw no merit in it.

From the professional military as well there were many warnings and suggestions that confrontation with China should be avoided till we build our strength. But these objections were summarily dismissed due to ‘political considerations’. Once India embarked upon the disastrous, legalistic, and militarily foolish ‘forward policy’ (of establishing small posts in Chinese-dominated areas), the die was cast and like a Greek tragedy the events moved towards a disaster.

In the popular mind the 1962 conflict evokes memories of an unimaginable defeat. This is not strictly true. In the northern sector, on the Ladakh front, the Indian Army, despite heavy odds, gave a good account of itself and Chinese gains were small. The airfield at Chushul, one of the major prizes, remained in Indian hands.

 The impression that it was an unmitigated disaster is fostered by the Indian rout at Sela. But for the Sela defeat and panic retreat, 1962 would have at worst been classed as a setback, not a disaster.

The discredit for this debacle belongs to Lieutenant General Brij Mohan Kaul and his catastrophic leadership. After the initial setback in Tawang district, in the last week of October, Kaul fell ill and Lt Gen Harbax Singh took over the command of 4 Corps.

Harbax consolidated the position at Sela and was quite confident of holding back the Chinese there. The order for withdrawal from Sela was a panic reaction by Kaul who had no fighting experience (he spent World War II in charge of a drama troupe for the entertainment of troops).

Harbax was a veteran and had faced the Japanese enveloping tactics in Burma. He was also confident that even if cut off from ground, Sela could be maintained by air. But to India’s ill luck, as soon as Kaul felt that the situation had stabilised on the front, he hastened back to 4 Corps not wanting to miss on the ‘credit’! The rest, as they say, is history. If instead of Kaul, Harbax had been in charge, the Sela disaster may not have happened at all.

But the biggest ‘mystery’ of 1962 is the non-use of offensive air power by India. The whole conflict was run as a personal show by Kaul and there was very little co-ordination with the air force. At that time the Chinese had barely two airfields in Tibet and their fighter aircraft were decidedly inferior to India’s British-made Hunters.

The Indian Air Force was guaranteed virtual air superiority on the battlefield. With air power on its side, India could have overcome the tactical disadvantage of lack of artillery in Ladakh and could have intercepted the foot and mule columns of the Chinese in Tawang area (like it did during the Kargil conflict in 1999). But such was the irrational fear of Chinese retaliation against Indian cities that India did not use its air power.

This fear of danger to cities was a result of panic in Calcutta… The only long-range aircraft the Chinese had at that time was the Ilyushin 24, operating at extreme ranges. The Indian Air Force with its network of airfields in the East (thanks to World War II) was well capable of dealing with it.

 Right till the end, Krishna Menon was in favour of use of air power, but was overruled by a leadership that had lost its nerve. Use of offensive air power could have tilted the balance on the ground and boosted the morale of our troops. The morale factor is of great importance as essentially even the Sela disaster was due to loss of morale.

The above analysis is not complete given the constraints of space. The full details will be before readers when the official history, of which I am the co-author, is released.

At the very basic level, the Indian Army was fighting a repeat of the 1947-48 Kashmir war, a campaign against tribal invaders, while the Chinese, veterans of the Korean War, were a well-oiled military machine.

The above analysis may seem unduly harsh, but that is the job of an analyst and it is time we face the truth, for in that lies the germ of future success.

Colonel (retd) Anil Athale, former director of war history at the defence ministry and co-author of the official history of the 1962 war, is a frequent contributor to these pages.

 

 

 

Terror email case cracked, cops say hacker employed with top IT company

Terror email case cracked, cops say hacker employed with top IT company 6 Oct 2008, 1816 hrs IST,Times Now

MUMBAI: Mumbai Police claimed to have made a major breakthrough in the blast terror e-mail case. Highly placed sources in the Mumbai Police claimed t hat they have taken into custody the elusive hacker behind the Indian Mujahideen terror emails. ( Watch ) The cops also claimed to have arrested as many as 15 people for their involvement in the Delhi, Ahmedabad, Surat and Bangalore blasts. Those arrested include Mohammad Azghar (31), Mohammad Shaikh (24) and Asif Bashiruddin Shaikh (22). Police said that the hacker is a highly qualified software engineer working with a top IT multinational in Mumbai at a senior position. Police sources also said that he belongs to a highly educated family and is also a high net-worth individual. The state Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had traced the e-mail sent to a media house by people claiming to belong to the Indian Mujahideen to the WiFi network of Matunga’s Khalsa College of Arts, Science and Commerce. The email had been sent at 7.05 pm on Saturday. Earlier investigations had shown that the senders hacked into the WiFi facility of the college, said the cops. But investigations reached a dead end when the senders deleted their log entries immediately after using the network. The Indian Mujahideen group had earlier used a non-secure WiFi network at the Navi Mumbai residence of American national Kenneth Haywood to send an email to various news organizations on July 26, just five minutes before the Ahmedabad explosions. In that case, Haywood’s WiFi router had its security features disabled.